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ABSTRACT

The Security and Privacy Implications of
Energy-Proportional Computing
SEPTEMBER 2013
SHANE S. CLARK
B.S., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
M.S., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Kevin Fu

The parallel trends of greater energy-eﬃciency and more aggressive power management are yielding computers that inch closer to energy-proportional computing
with every generation. Energy-proportional computing, in which power consumption
scales closely with workload, has unintended side eﬀects for security and privacy.
Saving energy is an unqualiﬁed boon for computer operators, but it is becoming
easier to identify computing activities by observing power consumption because an
energy-proportional computer reveals more about its workload.
This thesis demonstrates the potential for system-level power analysis—the inference of a computers internal states based on power observation at the “plug.” It
also examines which hardware components and software workloads have the greatest
impact on information leakage. This thesis identiﬁes the potential for privacy violations by demonstrating that a malicious party could identify which webpage from
vii

a given corpus a user is viewing with greater than 99% accuracy. It also identiﬁes
constructive applications for power analysis, evaluating its use as an anomaly detection mechanism for embedded devices with greater than 94% accuracy for each device
tested. Finally, this thesis includes modeling work that correlates AC and DC power
consumption to pinpoint which components contribute most to information leakage
and analyzes software workloads to identify which classes of work lead to the most
information leakage.
Understanding the security and privacy risks and opportunities that come with
energy-proportional computing will allow future systems to either apply system-level
power analysis fruitfully or thwart its malicious application.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

As computing power and eﬃciency improve in tandem, device power consumption is increasingly proportional to workload. Saving energy is an unqualiﬁed boon for
computer operators, but this trend has produced an unintentional side eﬀect: a modern computer’s power consumption, even observed at the granularity of a complete
system, reveals detailed information about its workload. Intuitively, reducing idle
power consumption lowers the eﬀective noise ﬂoor, making activity patterns “stick
out” more by raising the signal-to-noise ratio. The information leaked by these activity patterns can be leveraged to mount attacks against user or system privacy, or
to ensure that device behavior conforms to expectations.

1.1

Background and Motivation

The parallel trends of greater energy-eﬃciency and more aggressive power management are yielding computers that inch closer to energy-proportional computing
with every generation. An energy-proportional computer is one for which power consumption scales closely with workload. Unlike simple electronics that may have only
“on” and “oﬀ” states, energy-proportional computers have a wide power range [8],
with consumption closely mirroring workload ﬂuctuations. Figure 1.1b illustrates the
increasing energy proportionality of 3 commodity computers. The newer computers
show obvious power consumption scaling as each CPU core is put under load.
Dynamic voltage and frequency scaling (DVFS), clock gating, turbo modes, and
dark silicon [21] are all recent examples of hardware optimizations made in the service
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(a) An Apple advertisement from
2009 [6] touts energy-eﬃciency gains
that also happen to reveal keystrokes
in power traces.

(b) An illustration of increasing energy proportionality
for 3 computers. The oldest computer’s power consumption changes very little with resource consumption, but
the newest computer’s power consumption more than
doubles in response to workload changes.

Figure 1.1: Manufacturers consider increasing energy proportionality to be a marketable feature.
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of increasing both energy eﬃciency and performance for diﬀerent workloads. Modern
CPUs and GPUs supporting both clock gating and turbo modes, for example, can
power down one or more processor cores and increase the clock speed on others to
maximize single-threaded performance without violating thermal design power (TDP)
limits.
Both Intel and AMD have also begun to integrate CPUs and GPUs on the same
physical chip in the interest of energy savings. Tighter physical coupling allows designers to use fewer transistors by eliminating redundancies and simplifying data
sharing. AMD even markets their tightly integrated architectures as Application
Processing Units (APUs) [79] rather than CPUs, touting their promise as platforms
for heterogeneous computing frameworks such as OpenCL [41].
While techniques such as DVFS and clock gating are relatively new, the trend
toward greater energy eﬃciency extends far into the past. Koomey et al. point
out that energy eﬃciency (computations per kilowatt-hour) has doubled every 1.57
years from 1946 to 2009, with much room for improvement remaining—seven orders of
magnitude, extrapolating from an estimate by Feynman—until designs hit theoretical
limits [45].
Energy eﬃciency is in some ways a necessity for CPUs and GPUs because of TDP
constraints, but the designers of other computer hardware also have incentives to improve energy eﬃciency through government campaigns such as ENERGY STAR [73]
or the desire to advertise eco-friendliness as a feature. Western Digital, for example,
has a special line of eco-friendly hard drives branded as “Caviar Green” [81].
The growing consumer dependence on battery-constrained mobile devices has also
driven the adoption of aggressive power management techniques in software. New
operating systems leverage the low power modes oﬀered by modern hardware to cut
power consumption during periods of low activity. Windows 8, for example, even
mandates the suspension of most “Windows Store apps” that do not have focus to
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save power [23]. Similarly, the webpage for the Apple Mac Mini [6] claims that the
operating system
. . . never misses a power-saving opportunity, no matter how small. It
even regulates the processor between keystrokes, reducing power between
the letters you type.
Figure 1.1a shows the accompanying graphic. Microsoft’s “Building Windows 8” blog
also addresses OS power eﬃciency [69], referring to power management as
. . . a core OS capability that is critical on any chip architecture and any
PC form factor.
Abundant prior work has identiﬁed power consumption as a source of information
about a system’s internal state [7, 10, 19, 39, 42, 44], and thus a side channel that can
be used for attacks, with a focus on simple embedded systems or attacks based on
targeting a single power-consuming subsystem. A reasonable question in light of this
past work is what the impact of increasing energy proportionality is on the eﬀectiveness of power side channels at a coarser, system-level granularity. Prior work has not
considered the analysis of general-purpose computing devices at such a granularity.

1.2

Thesis Statement and Summary

The motivating idea of this thesis is:
The increasing energy proportionality of commodity computing devices has
created a system-level power side channel that enables both new attacks and
defensive techniques.
Because the trend toward energy proportionality is not a new phenomenon, widely
deployed computer systems are already amenable to system-level power analysis. Examining hardware available on the market today, this thesis identiﬁes 1) malicious
4

applications of the system-level power side channel, 2) constructive applications of
the system-level power side channel, and 3) which system components consume power
in the most characteristic ways.
1. Malicious applications
Like many side channels studied in previous work, system-level power consumption has the potential to leak private information about a computer or its operator. To demonstrate the potential for ﬁne-grained inferences about system
workload, I describe and demonstrate a supervised learning technique capable
of identifying which webpage from a training set a computer is loading with high
accuracy. In particular, I evaluate this classiﬁer with a variety of perturbations
in measurement conditions to ﬁnd the limits of its approach to classiﬁcation.
2. Constructive applications
Taking a less traditional view of power analysis, I describe and evaluate a system
for detecting abnormal behavior on embedded devices via power analysis. A key
question for system and network administrators is whether they can detect intrusions without compromising these machines’ operation or voiding warranties.
System-level power analysis oﬀers promise as one technique to address this problem. I take the examples of industrial control systems and medical devices to
illustrate how aberrant operating conditions can be reliably detected via power
analysis.
3. Modeling and causative analysis
Finally, I characterize how diﬀerent hardware components and workloads impact
the eﬃcacy of system-level power analysis. For some simple embedded systems,
this characterization allows direct attribution of almost all changes in power
consumption over time. For highly integrated commodity hardware, characterization relies on empirical correlation measures under a variety of workloads.
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This work sheds light on why the machine-learning based classiﬁers are eﬀective
for diﬀerent applications.

1.3

Contributions

In the course of investigating the eﬀects of energy proportionality on security and
privacy, this thesis makes the following high-level contributions:
• The description and analysis of an attack on privacy that identiﬁes speciﬁc
web-browsing activities via an AC power side channel.
• PowerTrip, a nonintrusive anomaly detection system for safety-critical embedded systems that oﬀers protection to devices that are historically diﬃcult to
protect with software- or network-based approaches.
• An investigation of the underlying causes of information leakage via systemlevel power consumption that elucidates under what conditions classiﬁcation is
eﬀective.
By demonstrating that system-level power analysis is an eﬀective means of making
detailed inferences about a computer’s internal state and investigating the underlying
causes, this thesis will help to predict how ever-increasing energy eﬃciency is likely
to impact future applications of system-level power analysis. Ideally, this thesis will
help future system designers to understand the risks of malicious power analysis,
how it can be defended against and how constructive power analysis can be fruitfully
applied.

1.4

Thesis Outline

The remainder of this thesis is organized according to the claimed contributions
as follows.
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Chapter 2 provides shared background on the topic of whole-system power analysis
— describing how power is consumed in the systems considered in this thesis and how
I gather power traces for analysis.
Chapter 3 addresses power analysis attacks. It analyzes an attack that identiﬁes
webpages using power traces from commodity computers.
Chapter 4 considers constructive applications for system-level power analysis —
presenting a nonintrusive anomaly detection system for embedded devices.
Chapter 5 characterizes the hardware components and workloads that contribute
most to the eﬃcacy of system-level power analysis.
Chapter 6 discusses the implications of this work to future applications of systemlevel power analysis and identiﬁes how continued improvements in energy proportionality may aﬀect security and privacy.
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CHAPTER 2
BACKGROUND IN SYSTEM-LEVEL POWER ANALYSIS

This chapter provides background on power analysis, with a focus on the techniques used in this thesis. It deﬁnes system-level power analysis, distinguishes alternating current power from direct current power, summarizes how empirical traces of
each diﬀer from idealized models, and describes the trace capture techniques used in
this work.

2.1

Power Analysis, Transmission, and Consumption

Power analysis is the process of making inferences from changes in power consumption over time [44]. System-level power analysis applies speciﬁcally to power traces
gathered at the granularity of a whole device, i.e., at the “plug” connecting the device
to the power infrastructure. Any system-level power trace of a computer necessarily
includes contributions from every component that draws power, such as CPU, GPU,
disk, and memory—which incorporates more information than any individual component’s power consumption, but also conﬂates the signals from these subsystems,
destroying some ﬁne-grained information. Given a power trace, one would like to
know what information it contains, and how to extract that information. In general,
the techniques best-suited to alternating current (AC) and direct current (DC) power
are not the same.
Power grids transport electricity to consumers using AC, in which the electric
charge periodically reverses direction. Many devices consume AC power directly, but
computing devices operate on DC power. Large industrial installations that comprise
8

(a) A DC trace of a programmable logic controller (PLC) periodically switching among
four states. All current values are positive,
with some ripple evident when the PLC remains in the same state. The values close to
72 mA represent one of two internal states that
alias in the trace.

(b) An AC trace of a PLC switching among the
same four states as in Figure 2.1a. The constant 60 Hz oscillations obfuscate the underlying signal and make it diﬃcult to discern more
than two states with the naked eye.

Figure 2.1: Even for relatively simple embedded devices, switched-mode power supplies complicate power analysis based on simple distance metrics.

many DC-powered devices may convert AC power to DC power at a centralized
location and distribute DC to devices within the facility. Consumer-oriented and
commodity hardware, such as personal computers, draw power from standard outlets
and handle power conversion themselves. This thesis considers computers used in
industrial control, medical, and consumer contexts, so we consider both AC and DC
devices.
To convert AC to DC power, computers use switched-mode power supplies (SMPSes) [29].
SMPSes take AC power as input (at 120 V in the United States) and provide DC power
as output at a variety of voltage levels that computer subsystems consume directly.
In the case of notebook computers, the power supply takes the form of a “brick” at
some point in the power cord that provides a single DC voltage to the computer.
Desktop form-factor computers typically include the power supply in the chassis and
provide multiple DC voltage levels.
Power analysis requires power traces as input. A power trace is a sequence of
time, power  pairs [44]. The interpretation of changes in the power values over time
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Figure 2.2: A closer look at an AC power trace that shows how heavily the SMPS in
the load and other noise from the grid distort the sinusoidal carrier.

depends on whether the trace represents AC or DC power, and the measurement
point from which the trace was gathered.
DC traces reﬂect changes in power consumption as increases and decreases in
the sampled wattage over time. In the absence of changes in consumption, a DC
power trace appears approximately as a line with slope zero. In practice, fast-moving
changes in power consumption due to irregularities in consumption create noise even
during “stable” periods, as Figure 2.1a shows.
AC power traces are more diﬃcult to interpret. The periodic changes in charge
direction manifest as a continuous sinusoidal ﬂuctuation symmetric about zero (at a
frequency of 60 Hz in the United States). Changes in power consumption are reﬂected
as changes in the amplitude of the sine wave, with higher amplitude corresponding
to more power consumption. In an ideal model, the power consumption one would
observe in an equivalent DC trace is simply amplitude-modulated onto the sinusoidal
carrier. Unlike DC power, however, the ineﬃciency of the SMPS in the device or load
consuming AC power creates additional artifacts in power traces that complicate
analysis, as Figures 2.1b and 2.2 illustrate.
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2.2

Capturing Power Traces

There are a variety of options for capturing power traces. This work focuses on
a single method that applies to any device drawing power via a wire and does not
require modiﬁcations to the device under test. We placed a sense resistor, a single
compact circuit element, in series with the devices we monitored, as depicted in
Figure 2.3a. As power passes through the resistor, the voltage delivered by the source
decreases based on the rated resistance. According to Ohm’s law [58], which states
that I =

R
V

where I is the current in amperes, R is the rated resistance in ohms, and

V is the observed voltage across the resistor in volts, we can calculate the current
consumed by the load. After calculating the current consumed by the load, we can
solve for power using the relationship P = V I, where P is the power in watts, V is
the voltage from by the source, and I is the calculated current in amperes. We use
the terms power trace, voltage trace, and current trace interchangeably because they
are all directly proportional to one another in the context of our measurements.
The measurement strategy varies slightly with the device under test. For DC
devices, the sense resistor can be placed in series with either the positive or negative terminal delivering power to the device. DC devices — which do not include
SMPSes — generally provide an accessible interface for power delivery, but it may
take diﬀerent forms for diﬀerent devices. AC devices have the beneﬁt of standard
wiring interfaces, so we instrumented a common North American NEMA 5-15 outlet.
Modern AC outlets have three terminals: hot, neutral, and ground. To measure a
device’s instantaneous current on the circuit, we placed a sense resistor (0.1 Ω, 1%
tolerance) in series with one terminal of an outlet (Figure 2.3b), into which we plugged
the device under test. For ease of experimentation, we extended the outlet from the
wall by stripping one end of an extension cord and plugging the other end into an
uninstrumented lab outlet.
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Safety note: This chapter is not a manual for electrical safety. Measuring “hot”
terminals is potentially fatally dangerous and should be conducted only under
qualiﬁed supervision. Do not try this in a non-laboratory setting.
To rapidly record and store power traces, we attached an Agilent U2356A data
acquisition unit (DAQ) to the terminals of the sense resistor [3]. The DAQ samples the
voltage across its probes and sends the data via USB to another PC (not the computer
being measured). For the experiments described later in this thesis, we recorded 16bit samples at a rate of 250 kHz (i.e., 4 Mb/s) to capture workload artifacts occurring
at up to 125 kHz.
Alternate techniques to measure power consumption include Hall eﬀect sensors [64]
or custom powerline interface devices like that built by Gupta et al. [63]. Sensors relying on the Hall eﬀect inductively couple with the electromagnetic ﬁeld created around
a wire carrying current, and so do not need to be inserted in series. The drawbacks to
Hall eﬀect sensors are that they are generally less sensitive and that they may sense
nearby electrical ﬁelds not produced by the load of interest. Powerline interfaces allow
single-point monitoring of a household from any outlet but, because they are not in
series with a load, mainly observe changes in SMPS switching frequency or transient
interference produced by device on–oﬀ transitions [63].
2.2.1

Information in Power Traces

Extracting information from DC power traces is relatively straightforward because
they are simple representations of the power consumption over time. The limiting
factor for inferences from DC traces is how directly one is able to map diﬀerent operations to diﬀerent power proﬁles. In the ideal case of a perfectly energy-proportional
computer, each operation or internal state would map to a distinct power proﬁle, but
in practice many states may alias to the same proﬁle because, at the level of an entire
system, many power-consuming components may contribute to the single power consumption value observable with our technique. Figure 2.1a shows an example of alias12

Measurement points

Measurement points

A/C

Rsense

Sense resistor
(behind outlet)

Outlet

(a) A circuit diagram of our measurement technique. The diﬀerence
in voltage on either side of the resistor (Rsense ) is proportional to the
power consumed by the AC device
at left. The same measurement technique applies to DC circuits.

(b) An instrumented AC outlet for capturing power
traces. A data-acquisition unit connects to measurement points on either side of a 1 cm sense resistor.

Figure 2.3: This work relies on straightforward power circuit instrumentation.

ing. DC power measurements explored in previous research require tracing individual
components’ power consumption on a circuit board to gather more detailed information [44]. Such techniques require access to internal hardware elements and do not
meet our goal of nonintrusiveness, or avoiding hardware modiﬁcation/disassembly.
AC power traces are more complicated signals that require more sophisticated
classiﬁcation strategies in general. The bulk of this thesis focuses on AC power
analysis based on the devices we wish to analyze. Past research has identiﬁed three
primary sources of information leakage from SMPSes that manifest themselves in
a computing device’s power consumption: current ﬂuctuations, reactive power, and
changes in switching speed.
• Current ﬂuctuations: If any particular component conveys information via
its power consumption, then that information may appear in a power trace,
where its power consumption is reﬂected as an increase in amplitude — or it may
be lost to destructive interference from other signals. Prior work on Nonintrusive
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Load Monitoring (NILM) seeks to infer the on/oﬀ state of appliances based on
changes in current consumption at the granularity of a household [32, 31].
• Reactive power Unlike eﬃcient resistive loads (e.g., incandescent lights), the
capacitive and inductive components inside SMPSes distort the shape of the sinusoidal AC waveform, drawing the current and voltage waveforms out of phase
and returning power to the source in the form of reactive power. The amount
of reactive power varies with the load, leaking information about system-level
power consumption onto the power line.
• Changes in switching speed Like any electrical device that switches on and
oﬀ, an SMPS emits electromagnetic interference (EMI) that other devices can
detect. The switching speed varies with the components’ aggregate demand for
power. To meet emissions standards (e.g., FCC Title 47 CFR Part 15 [25]),
SMPSes contain inductors that ﬁlter out noise at frequencies above the voltage
regulator’s switching frequency. This EMI ﬁltering does not prevent activity
information from appearing on the AC power line, as Gupta et al.and Enev et al.
demonstrate [63, 29, 19].

2.3

Summary

This chapter provided the background on power systems and power measurements
necessary to understand the modeling and classiﬁcation approaches in this thesis. It
deﬁned system-level power analysis, summarized the essential characteristics of DC
and AC power traces, and described the trace capture techniques used in this work.
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CHAPTER 3
MODELING POWER CONSUMPTION

The development and evaluation of an eﬀective classiﬁer for a given set of traces—
whether those traces represent power consumption or some other phenomenon—
depends on an accurate model of the input. This thesis addresses two broad classes
of devices: embedded control systems based on ﬁrmwares, and general-purpose computers running commodity operating systems but dedicated to a speciﬁc application.
Some ﬁrmware-based systems such as programmable logic controllers (PLCs) that
contain few discrete components are amenable to some level of generative modeling
that maps computing tasks directly to power consumption. Commodity platforms, on
the other hand, exhibit more complicated hardware/software interactions and tremendous state spaces. The classiﬁers that we apply to commodity platforms thus rely on
discriminative models—learning how to discriminate among power traces rather than
understanding how the power traces are produced by the corresponding workloads.
This chapter examines the challenge of modeling power consumption for the devices considered in this thesis and addresses the question of why power traces are
diﬀerentiable. It is not necessary to answer this question in the context of creating a
classiﬁer for a narrowly speciﬁed application, but answering the “why” question is important when reasoning about the limits of a classiﬁcation approach or how changing
conditions are likely to aﬀect performance. To that end, this chapter examines the
hardware and software variables that produce identiﬁable diﬀerences in power traces
and the underlying causes of distinct power signatures on both embedded devices
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such as PLCs and commodity computers that are somehow constrained to a limited
state space. It answers the following questions:
• What are the major barriers to the development of detailed generative models?
• Which computer subsystems account for the most system-level power consumption?
• What types of software workloads produce the most easily identiﬁed power
traces?
To answer these questions, we contrast generative and discriminative models for
diﬀerent pieces of hardware, present approximate power budgets for diﬀerent computing devices, and quantify the relationship between system-level AC power consumption and each DC power channel provided by a commodity SMPS in a personal
computer.
We rule out the RAM, hard disk, and GPU as key sources of information in
system-level desktop power traces and identify the CPU as the most likely source.
We also ﬁnd that GPU-intensive workloads provide comparatively little information,
and that more diverse workloads such as webpage rendering are easier to identify.

3.1

Generative and Discriminative Models

Generative models map speciﬁc processes to the observable phenomena they produce. They have the potential to produce highly accurate classiﬁers for which it is
possible to reason about the precise limitations based on the model, but exhaustive
modeling of even simple systems is a diﬃcult task. For their work on the energyaware Mementos system [65], Ransford et al. augmented a cycle-accurate simulator
of the MSP430 family of microcontrollers [20] with an empirical energy model for
the purposes of simulating power failures on batteryless devices. This detailed model
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required knowledge of the instructions executed (extracted from compiled programs)
and the diﬀerences in energy consumption for diﬀerent classes of instruction, e.g.,
those addressing registers, RAM, ﬂash, or peripherals like analog-digital converters.
Creating such detailed models requires extensive measurements on a per-platform
basis. This resource investment makes it an impractical approach for many of the
platforms discussed in this thesis, since the goal is to rapidly produce a model based
on a short proﬁling or learning period and without access to object code. Less detailed
generative models, however, may still be valuable.
Discriminative models allow a classiﬁer to identify outputs belonging to diﬀerent
classes, but do not necessarily provide any insight into what the sources of information
are. For example a classiﬁer trained on power traces of a lamp might learn that the
lamp is on when the power consumption is high and oﬀ otherwise, but this model
alone does not oﬀer any insight into how a lamp works. For our purposes, we focus on
discriminative models developed internally by a supervised learning algorithm. These
models have the advantage of working with standard approaches and do not require
many a priori assumptions or a detailed understanding of the underlying process.
Understanding the limits of a classiﬁer’s internal model and predicting how it will
perform under changing conditions, however, is a secondary problem that must be
addressed when using discriminative models.

3.2

Building a Generative PLC Model

A PLC is a computer designed to issue electrical signals to other devices along
control lines, according to some program its operator has provided. PLCs are ubiquitous in industrial and commercial automation settings. PLC ﬁrmware programs are
structured as loops, each iteration of which encodes I/O or computation.
Some PLCs run embedded operating systems such as real-time Linux variants, but
these are relatively recent arrivals; traditionally PLCs run a single ﬁrmware program
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Figure 3.1: A Siemens S7-1200 1214C AC/DC/Rly PLC (top) with a “trainer” box
providing input and output hardware (bottom).

without a multitasking OS underneath. A typical PLC of either type comprises a
power supply, a CPU, and I/O modules that contain solid-state relays, transistors,
and digital–analog conversion components. After an operator loads compiled ﬁrmware
onto the PLC via a temporary wired connection, the ﬁrmware program runs as soon
as the PLC is powered.
PLCs, which we consider in depth in Chapter 5, are amenable to generative modeling because their ﬁrmwares generally map a small set of inputs to a small set of
outputs. The Siemens S7-1200 PLCs we focus on in this work, for example, are
equipped with a microcontroller, 4 inputs, 4 outputs, and pulse-width modulation
output support. Figure 3.1 depicts one of these PLCs. A detailed generative model
in the style of Mementos [65] would proﬁle the run time energy costs of each instruction or class of instructions and produce a series of expected time, power pairs.
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This type of modeling proves to be diﬃcult and of limited value when applied to
PLCs for a number of reasons. First, the object and binary ﬁle formats used with
Siemens PLCs are not open or well-documented and neither are the performance
details or instruction set architecture for the MCU. Second, the PLCs implement
a visual programming model that maps to a ﬁnite state machine. In the absence of
input changes or logic dependent upon a clock signal, the PLC will remain in a steady
state with no signiﬁcant power consumption changes. Finally, many PLC input and
output circuits are identical in terms of hardware, comprising a control pin from the
MCU and a solid-state relay or transistor to electrically isolate the PLC from its I/O
devices.
Work by Cárdenas et al. addresses these limitations by directly monitoring input
and output hardware as a way of enforcing the set of valid I/O states [11]. Their
system does not attempt to model the MCU’s internal state. The work we present in
Chapter 5 takes a similar approach to DC-powered PLCs, but seeks generality across
deployments by monitoring only the PLC itself without knowledge of the particular
I/O hardware. Using our approach, we ﬁnd that we can reliably identify the number
of inputs and the number of outputs in a “high” state, but cannot diﬀerentiate which
inputs and outputs are in a high state. The classiﬁer is thus limited to determining whether power traces are plausible based on the number of inputs and outputs
expected. As the number of inputs and outputs increases, the potential for aliasing
increases. This is because the total number of distinct states is proportional to 2n ,
but the total number of distinguishable I/O states is proportional to n2 where n is
the number of inputs and outputs.
The advantages of this model are that the limitations are readily apparent and
the inputs are well-understood. We can also extend this model to AC-powered PLCs
given the assumption that state changes occur at a frequency signiﬁcantly less than
60 Hz, as Chapter 5 shows. A future classiﬁer based on the model could be designed
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Condition

Power (W) vs. Baseline

Idle Baseline
Input high
Output high

4.7
+0.3
+2.2

Table 3.1: The approximate power budgets for an S7-1200 PLC. Numbers beginning
with + are relative to the baseline of 4.7 W.

to work even without an online training period. For our PLCs, hardware proﬁling
proves to be a simple task. Using a P3 Kill A Watt power monitor [62], we recorded
the baseline power consumption and the changes in power consumption for input and
output hardware. The results are summarized in Table 3.1. With hardware power
budgets and knowledge of the state space, one could predict the power consumption
levels that a given ﬁrmware has the potential to produce.

3.3

Building Discriminative Models for Commodity PCs

Commodity PCs represent a formidable modeling challenge because of their hardware and software complexity. CPUs and GPUs each include billions of transistors
and operating systems consist of tens of millions of lines of code [56]. On top of
this complexity, features like multi-threading and interrupt handling create an environment in which it is unclear how to even precisely describe a single distinct state.
Rather than attempting to tackle this problem directly, side-channel research, including Chapters 4 and 5, generally relies on discriminative models or explicitly models
only a portion of a complex system [7, 19, 29, 42, 48, 61, 53].
The general form of a discriminative model for supervised learning is a set of
classiﬁer parameters learned from the training set. For the random forest classiﬁer
used by PowerTrip, these parameters are feature values assigned to nodes in a set of
decision trees. Under the assumptions that the training and testing sets are drawn
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from approximately the same statistical distribution and that the feature vector contains enough information to diﬀerentiate the classes, this model allows the classiﬁer
to reliably label inputs correctly. A diﬃcult question to answer is: under what conditions are these assumptions invalid? Finding the answer to this question is key when
reasoning about changing classiﬁcation conditions.
Chapter 4 explores many variations on the webpage classiﬁcation problem with the
goal of understanding when the testing set is diﬀerent enough from the training set to
degrade classiﬁer performance. We found that most changes in browsing conditions
had little eﬀect on accuracy, but hardware and software changes largely invalidated
the learned model. To avoid repeated classiﬁer training and testing, another approach
is to isolate the sources of identiﬁability by ﬁnding other characterizations of power
consumption.
3.3.1

Understanding sources of identiﬁability

To identify promising sources of information for system-level power analysis, the
components consuming the most power are a possible starting point. We measured
the power consumption of a 2008 MacBook under a variety of workloads designed
to stress individual subsystems. We used a P3 Kill A Watt power monitor [62] to
measure power consumption. Table 3.2 summarizes the results, which suggest that
the MacBook’s CPU and GPU dominate power consumption under load. The network
interfaces and solid-state storage draw comparatively little power.
These data suggest that, if each subsystem exhibits the same degree of energy
proportionality and is placed under the same load, the CPU and GPU contributions
to power consumption are the most visible in power traces and also contain the most
information. Whether these two assumptions are true in practice is diﬃcult to assess.
Prior side-channel work has leveraged network characteristics such as packet timings [68] or lengths [82, 83] to classify webpages according to their network traﬃc. A
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Condition

Power (W) vs. Baseline

Baseline (idle, screen oﬀ)

8

One core at 100%
Two cores at 100%
GPU at 100%
Wired network saturated
Wireless network saturated
File copy, SSD to SSD
Screen at maximum brightness

+7
+11
+11
+2
+3
+6
+6

Table 3.2: MacBook power consumption under various types of load. Numbers beginning with + are relative to the baseline of 8 W.

natural question to ask is whether power traces provide information about network
characteristics based on the power that network components consume. An experiment suggests that system-level power traces in fact do not map exactly onto network
traﬃc. We tapped the activity LED of a network switch port to capture a representation of a computer’s network traﬃc while also tracing the computer’s AC power
line. Figure 3.2a shows an example from our tests. The computer consumes power
performing other tasks before the network interface actually begins to send and receive packets. Furthermore, the AC power provides insight into client scripts and
rendering loads unavailable in a network trace.
Power consumption appears to be more strongly correlated with system calls than
with network activity as shown by Figure 3.2b. Tracking the number of system calls
initiated by the browser process with DTrace captures memory allocation and disk
I/O in addition to network activity, enabling monitoring of all of the components we
have identiﬁed as major power consumers.
While these experiments point to the CPU as a likely primary source of information, they are not conclusive because they do not allow us to attribute the power
consumption for a given application to a speciﬁc subsystem.
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(a) The network activity is correlated with
high current consumption, but is not the only
cause. Spikes before and after network activity (which is depicted in red) show that local
computation dominates the consumption.

(b) The system call activity (as measured by
DTrace) is also correlated with high current
consumption, and our results suggest that systems exercised by system calls are a major
cause of consumption.

Figure 3.2: Time-domain plots as a MacBook loads webpages. Both network activity
and system calls appear to correlate with energy consumption.

3.3.2

Attributing System-level Consumption

Directly discovering which components account for the majority of the systemlevel power consumption requires that we directly measure the various subsystems.
Neither desktops nor laptop computers are designed to allow this type of proﬁling.
The SMPS in a desktop computer is integrated into the chassis and does not expose
any of the DC power channels that it provides to the internal components. Laptop
computers expose their SMPSes, which take the form of power cord “bricks”, but the
DC side of the SMPS only provides a single voltage. Sampling this DC signal does
not provide more detailed per-component information, as Figure 3.3 shows.
We built a piece of custom measurement hardware to gain per-component visibility. Extending the basic technique of placing a sense resistor in series with the load,
we instrumented each wire carrying DC power from a desktop SMPS to the system
components. This includes power cables for the hard disk (HDD) and GPU, as well
as multiple cables carrying various voltages to the motherboard. Figure 3.4 depicts
a rough schematic of the measurement harness and Figure 3.5 shows the harness itself attached to our test machine, a Dell Vostro desktop with quad-core Intel Core
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Figure 3.3: A time-series plot of the simultaneous AC and DC current consumption
while loading a webpage. The DC current is plotted as the moving average with a
red dotted line. We plot the AC current as its envelope for easy comparison. The
AC envelope closely matches the DC consumption, which is also a system-level power
channel.

i5 processor, 4 GB of RAM, AMD Radeon 6450 GPU, and 250 GB SATA magnetic
drive, tested under Windows 7. Finally, we sampled the voltage drop across all of the
resistors simultaneously using an Agilent U2356A Data Acquisition Unit (DAQ) [3].
The DAQ output is a set of simultaneous power traces representing the system-level
consumption and the consumption of each instrumented DC channel.
Identifying which channels provide power to which components is not straightforward. Power connectors that go directly from the SMPS to a component like the hard
disk or GPU are unambiguous, but others are not. Without schematics of the motherboard’s power distribution circuitry, we must make educated guesses about where
it routes power based on a set of workloads designed to stress speciﬁc subsystems.
For analysis, we calculate the mutual information between the AC power trace
and each of the DC channels (labeled as DC1, DC2,...,DC28) to attribute the systemlevel power consumption to the various subsystems. The mutual information is a
measure of the statistical dependence between two random variables, calculated as
the diﬀerence between the marginal unconditional entropy of one variable and the
entropy of that variable conditioned on the other, expressed as: I(feature; class) =
H(feature) − H(feature|class) where H is the entropy and I the mutual information.
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Figure 3.4: An approximate schematic of the measurement harness we used to correlate AC and DC power consumption. A sense resistor placed in series with each
wire coming from the SMPS allows us to simultaneously sample the system-level and
per-component power consumption.

Sense resistor bank

DAQ interface

Figure 3.5: The wiring harness we used to correlate AC and DC power consumption.
The bank of sense resistors and the DAQ interface are outlined in green.
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Workload
RAM test
1/2/3/4 inﬁnite loop threads
Large ﬁle copy
OpenGL demo
Idle
1080p video
Static webpage load
cnn.com load
Emulated malware infection
“Ramnit” malware infection

Top channels
1, 21
21, 22
26, 22, 25, 21
None
25, 22, 21
None
25, 26, 22, 21, 20, ...
25, 26, 22, 21, 20, ...
26, 25
26, 25

Max Mutual Info
0.17
0.29
0.26
0.08
0.19
0.05
0.70
0.32
0.35
0.29

Table 3.3: The workloads for which we gathered simultaneous AC and DC traces, and
the results. The workloads listed in the top half of the table attempt to create a bestcase analysis scenario for a speciﬁc subsystem. Those in the bottom half represent
real-world applications. The top channels are those for which the normalized mutual
information exceeded 10% of the AC channel.

We calculate the mutual information in bits and then normalize it, with a value of 1
being equal to the mutual information between the AC channel and itself (which is
the entropy of the AC channel). This metric is the normalized mutual information.
Changes in the normalized mutual information across diﬀerent workloads indicate
which components are best represented in the system-level power consumption. We
tested a number of workloads designed to stress individual subsystems and also to
mimic the malware and webpage workloads explored in this thesis. Table 3.3 lists
the workloads tested. We only consider channels to carry a signiﬁcant amount of
information if the normalized mutual information exceeds 0.10.
The results summarized in Table 3.3 allow us to come to several conclusions, which
we present in terms of components and then in terms of workloads.
3.3.2.1

Component results

The RAM test is the only workload for which DC1 appears as a top channel. DC1
is the 12 V rail that goes directly from the power supply to the DVD drive. This
is unsurprising, because the test runs from a bootable CD. The other top channel,
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DC21, appears in most of the other workloads. It is one of the 12 V rails going to the
24-pin main motherboard connector [35, 36]. These observations lead us to conclude
that the RAM’s power consumption provides little information because it does not
change the order of top channels when we stress the RAM almost exclusively.
The GPU also provides little information. Like many discrete (stand-alone) graphics cards, the AMD Radeon HD6450 in our test system has a dedicated power connector, which never appears in the top channels even when running an OpenGL demo
that should saturate GPU resources. The GPU also draws power from its PCI Express connector, but the two GPU-intensive workloads yielded no DC channels that
met our normalized mutual information threshold.
Similarly, the hard drive provides little information about system-level power consumption. DC2 and DC14 are the two power rails dedicated to the hard drive and
neither appears as a top channel for any workload—including a large ﬁle copy.
Finally, the CPU appears to be a major source of information. The inﬁnite loop
workload yields two top channels, DC21 and DC22, which each appear in many of
the other workloads. These channels power the 24-pin motherboard connector, but
their relative value in other traces suggests that they route to the CPU.
3.3.2.2

Workload results

The top channels for the real-world workloads are largely the same, and are all part
of the 24-pin ATX connector on the motherboard. The maximum mutual information
observed in the real-world workloads is generally higher than it is for individual subcomponent tests. Without more information about how the motherboard routes
each DC channel, we cannot conclude for certain which components actually provide
the most information though discovering this information would provide a detailed
mapping [36, 35].
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The real-world workload experiments do show that workloads placing loads on
several components provide the most sources of information. The webpage tests both
make use of the CPU, RAM, HDD, and network interface and each has more than
ﬁve channels meeting our normalized mutual information threshold.

3.4

Summary

Developing a power consumption model is a necessary step in the development of a
power trace classiﬁer. For relatively simple embedded systems like PLCs, a generative
model based on empirical measurements is suﬃcient to design an eﬀective classiﬁer
with known strengths and weaknesses. The complexity of commodity computing
hardware and software systems makes building a comprehensible generative model
prohibitively diﬃcult. Instead, a suitable feature vector combined with a generalpurpose classiﬁer allows the creation of an accurate discriminative model. The major
drawback to a discriminative model is the diﬃculty inherent in predicting under what
conditions the model will break down.
This chapter summarizes the speciﬁc barriers to constructive a generative model
for a PLC and also for commodity computers and shows how to build upon a discriminative model of a complex system to proﬁle the underlying reasons why a classiﬁcation
approach is successful. We rule out the RAM, hard disk, and GPU as key sources of
information in system-level desktop power traces and identify the CPU as the most
likely source. We also ﬁnd that GPU-intensive workloads provide comparatively little
information, and that more diverse workloads such as webpage rendering are easier
to identify.
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CHAPTER 4
POWER ANALYSIS ATTACKS

Power consumption is well-established as an undesirable side channel that poses
privacy risks, including the disclosure of user inputs, cryptographic keys, and display contents [77, 78, 44, 28, 48, 19]. The ever-increasing energy proportionality of
commodity computing hardware according to Koomey’s Law (see Chapter 2) has
the potential to exacerbate long-standing concerns about power side channels. As
power consumption scales more closely with workload, a key question is whether new
side channels arise or existing side channels become more accessible or leak more
information.
This chapter explores the impact of systemwide power analysis on computing
privacy, presenting a new attack against user privacy based on monitoring AC power
consumption at the plug. It answers the following questions:
• To what extent can we identify web traﬃc from AC power traces?
• What characterizes the information leaked by a modern computer via AC power
consumption?
• To what changes in measurement conditions are AC power signatures robust?
This chapter demonstrates that relatively coarse-grained measurements in combination with standard machine learning techniques are suﬃcient to glean ﬁne-grained
information from a commodity computer. The major contribution is the examination
of how accurately an attacker can distinguish which webpage a user is loading under
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a wide range of conditions. Our classiﬁer can identify which of 50 candidate webpages
a browser is loading with 99% precision and 99% recall. The classiﬁer is also robust
to several changes in browsing conditions. While this chapter focuses on the problem
of identifying webpages, the attack’s accuracy and robustness have implications for
the privacy of other potentially sensitive information that may become manifest in
power traces.

4.1

Introduction

Computer users commonly assume that software mechanisms, such as in-browser
encryption, protect their private information. Research on side channels has challenged this assumption by showing that computer components such as the CPU [44]
and the keyboard [78] can leak private information. Along the same lines, this chapter examines the feasibility of inferring private information from a general-purpose
computer’s AC power consumption, despite signiﬁcant additive noise from the power
grid [14].
Past work has exploited AC power side channels for information leakage, but at
the level of an entire household [60] or a device with a constrained state space [19, 14].
For example, a television that is dedicated to displaying videos produces consistent
power consumption over multiple plays of the same video because there is a direct relationship between total screen brightness and power consumption per frame. Given
a small number of candidate videos, it is possible to identify which of them is playing [19]. A general-purpose computer, on the other hand, exhibits a tremendous state
space because of its practically unconstrained operation. Executing the same computing task at diﬀerent times may result in diﬀerent power consumption patterns because
of diﬀerent background tasks or I/O workloads (e.g., network activity). Nevertheless,
we ﬁnd that system-wide traces of AC power consumption leak enough information
about the operation of a general-purpose computer to identify the webpage that the
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computer is loading (out of a set of known pages). Because browsers use a diverse
subset of the available hardware components, our results suggest that this technique
may generalize to other computing workloads.
Several factors work to our advantage. Web browsers increasingly take advantage
of hardware to improve the user’s experience (by, e.g., executing native code [84]),
resulting in resource consumption that scales with the webpage’s complexity. Another
factor is that modern computers and operating systems aggressively try to reduce
power consumption [73], resulting in energy-proportional computing in which the
power consumption tightly ﬁts the workload [14]. Both of these factors increase the
system’s dynamic range, which in turn increases the information available in power
traces.
There are also challenges to the task of identifying webpages from AC power consumption. The fundamental challenge is separating interesting activity from baseline
power consumption, which a computer’s power supply aggregates. Other challenges
stem from the dynamic nature of the Internet and modern websites. The round trip
time for fetching webpages may change over time; many websites include scripts that
run long after the page loads, and many customize content for each visitor.
This chapter’s contribution is the analysis of an attack on privacy that identiﬁes
speciﬁc web-browsing activities via an AC power side channel. We characterize and
measure this side channel by designing methods to extract patterns of power consumption as a computer loads a webpage. These patterns, which are obscure in the
time domain but more apparent in the frequency domain, act as power signatures
that allow an eavesdropper to determine which webpage is being loaded. Additionally, these power signatures are robust against a variety of changes to the computing
environment, including background processes, changes in network location, the use
of a VPN, or even the use of a diﬀerent computer. Because most of the identiﬁable
information occurs at under 10 kHz in the frequency domain, capturing and exﬁltrat-
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ing power measurements is within reason for a simple embedded device that could ﬁt
discreetly inside a power outlet.
Using a covertly modiﬁed electrical outlet to record power consumption, we trained
and tested a classiﬁer with over 100 hours of traces representing more than 13, 000
page loads from a set of 51 webpages from sites representing over 30% of global page
views. Given a power trace with 51 possible labels, the classiﬁer identiﬁed the correct
match from the training set with 99% precision (resistance to false positives) and
99% recall (resistance to false negatives). Given an unlabeled trace from one of 441
webpages not in the training set, the classiﬁer’s false positive rate is less than 2%.
In some cases, the classiﬁer succumbs to overﬁtting when trained on traces from a
single computer, confusing other power activity for browsing activity. However, when
trained on traces from two computers, the classiﬁer identiﬁes the common patterns
that are due to browser activity and can correctly label unseen traces from either
computer.
This work conceptually bridges the gap between previous work on circuit-level
direct-current (DC) power analysis [44] and coarser-grained, household-level activity
recognition via AC power measurements [32, 63, 29]. This chapter also proposes
several hardware and software countermeasures to minimize information leakage.
4.1.1

Threat model

Focusing on the AC power side channel, this chapter considers an attacker with
physical access to a power outlet the victim might use. Possible easy targets include
outlets in coﬀee shops and airports. A simple modiﬁcation to a power outlet enables
discreet data recording. Because most users implicitly trust power outlets, an attacker
may gain easy, persistent access to a victim’s power-consumption patterns.
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4.2

Background and Challenges

This section distinguishes AC power measurements from DC power measurements,
which have been studied extensively in literature about side channels [44, 10]. It
breaks down the power budget of a computer and discusses how the actions of a
web browser inﬂuence power consumption. Finally, it explains some of the challenges
inherent in our attempts to classify AC power traces.
4.2.1

AC Versus DC Power Traces

DC power measurements explored in previous research require tracing individual
components’ power consumption on a circuit board. Such techniques require access to
internal hardware elements and are overly intrusive from the viewpoint of our threat
model. An attacker conforming to our threat model seeks a power-analysis technique
that is relatively nonintrusive and does not involve opening or modifying the victim’s
computer. AC power is, in a sense, the least common denominator: every computer
operates on power drawn from a power grid. A laptop user may avoid drawing power
from the grid by relying on the battery, but this is a temporary solution. Monitoring
AC power consumption aﬀords a system-wide view of the computer’s activity.
The periodicity inherent in AC signals shapes our analysis approach. Whereas
DC signals often feature prominent level shifts and other artifacts that are amenable
to time-domain analysis, the alternating nature of AC current essentially convolves
sets of sinusoids, making time-domain analysis diﬃcult. The constant 60 Hz oscillations are particularly problematic because even minor phase misalignments foil many
similarity metrics. We therefore perform analysis in the frequency domain. Before
classiﬁcation, we transform traces into the frequency domain (Figure 4.1b) using
the Fourier transform. In addition to making certain signals easier to identify (e.g.,
60 Hz utility power in the U.S.), this approach enables meaningful comparisons despite misaligned traces, or traces of diﬀerent lengths, and the additive nature of the
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(a) Time-domain plots

(b) Frequency-domain plots

Figure 4.1: Time- and frequency-domain plots of several power traces as a MacBook
loads two diﬀerent pages. In the frequency domain, brighter colors represent more
energy at a given frequency. Despite the lack of obviously characteristic information
in the time domain, the classiﬁer correctly identiﬁes all of the above traces.

SMPS’s power consumption preserves frequency information from individual components’ power consumption.

4.3

Approach: Supervised Learning Classiﬁer

To distinguish among webpages, we adopt a supervised learning approach, in
which we train a classiﬁer on labeled AC power traces and then attempt to match
unlabeled traces. An AC power trace contains artifacts of every powered computer
component, each of which may have its own clock rate or power signature, and each of
which processes information diﬀerently. We assume that disentangling these signals
(multicore CPU, multicore video card, multiple drives, etc.) from a single AC power
trace is intractable with current techniques, and instead focus on coarser-grained,
system-level questions, such as which popular webpage the user is loading. It is
prohibitively diﬃcult to create a generative model of how speciﬁc computing tasks will
map to power consumption. For this reason, a discriminative model — one that can
discriminate among power traces rather than understand how traces are generated
from hardware — is more appropriate. Our supervised-learning approach ﬁts this
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requirement; it requires only a labeled training set to build a model. Speciﬁcally, we
train support vector machines (SVMs) using the open-source library libsvm [13].
4.3.1

Feature selection

Classiﬁcation requires extracting feature vectors on which to train a classiﬁer.
A naı̈ve classiﬁer might simply consider the length feature of a sample in the time
domain, deﬁned as the length of time for which power consumption remains above a
predetermined threshold. However, background tasks add confounding noise in the
time domain, obscuring the true endpoints of a speciﬁc task, and tasks often include
periods of both high and low power consumption. A more robust approach is to
classify traces based on features from the frequency domain.
We transform traces into the frequency domain by ﬁrst calculating the spectrogram using rectangular sliding windows 1000 samples wide with 50% overlap. Rectangular windows are the simplest choice and 50% overlap is standard in many applications. We then collapse the spectrogram into a single Fourier transform by summing
over all of the time steps. As a base set of features for classiﬁcation, we divide the
Fourier transform of each power trace into 500 segments, each 250 Hz wide, starting
at 0–250 Hz and ending at 124.75–125 kHz, half the 250 kHz sample rate at which we
recorded traces. This process yields 500 features, each of which represents the power
present within one 250 Hz slice of spectrum over the duration of the trace.
As described in Section 4.2.1, classifying in the frequency domain allows meaningful comparisons between misaligned traces or traces of diﬀerent lengths. Using
the output directly from the Fourier transform as a feature vector is a simple approach and yields excellent results. It is also straightforward to visualize diﬀerences
in the Fourier transform, as shown in Figure 4.2. Plotting the feature vector reveals
consistent features between the two traces of cnn.com and recognizable diﬀerences
between a trace of yahoo.com and the cnn.com traces, which are not obvious in the
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(a) The full frequency range of our feature vectors.
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(b) A tighter view of the same plot focusing on the most easily distinguished window.

Figure 4.2: Plots of three of our Fourier transform feature vectors. While the pages
are diﬃcult to separate visually in the time domain, the two cnn.com samples are
indistinguishable to the eye in the frequency domain, whereas yahoo.com diverges
around 25 and 65 kHz.

time domain. The plots also reveal that the diﬀerences between the two pages appear
at low frequencies and again at the power supply’s switching frequency of ∼65 kHz.
4.3.2

Classiﬁcation

We train a binary classiﬁer for each page in our corpus. After training all 51
SVMs, we use each of them to classify test samples. A test sample is an unlabeled
500-dimensional feature vector, obtained in the same way as the training samples,
that is not in the training set. Each SVM determines whether the test sample was
an instance of the webpage it was trained to recognize. In the interest of simplicity,
we do not implement a multi-class labeling solution in which all 51 SVMs collectively
generate a single output, but there are a variety of well-studied techniques for this
purpose and libsvm implements several of them [34].
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There are three notable details of the training process. First, we jointly normalize
feature values across all samples. This prevents features with large values (e.g., the
low frequency elements) from dominating features with smaller values. Second, we use
standard 10-fold cross-validation to avoid overﬁtting at training time. By repeatedly
splitting the training set and retraining each time, the classiﬁer avoids the possibility
of biases in a small number of training examples producing a biased model. Finally,
we use a radial basis function (RBF) kernel, as recommended by the authors of
libsvm [13].

4.4

Methods and Metrics

To cover a diverse set of webpages representing typical Internet traﬃc, we chose 48
webpages drawn from Alexa’s list of the top 500 websites [5], discarding duplicates and
adult websites. Alexa is a web analytics company that tracks website popularity using
a browser toolbar installed in millions of browsers worldwide. The list of Alexa top
sites is based on a large but biased sample, but we are not aware of any freely available
alternatives without obvious biases. By Alexa’s estimates, the top 48 websites we
used represent over 30% of global page views (Figure 4.3). We added the top Google
result for “cheap Viagra” as an example of a potentially embarrassing (or malicious)
page. To include a page that loads with negligible latency, we added two authors’
department’s home pages, a < 1 ms round trip from one of our measurement points,
bringing the number of webpages in our training set to 51.
The Alexa rankings list websites, but it is more meaningful to collect traces of
individual webpages. Each of our traces represents an automated load of the front
page of one of the 51 websites. To record realistic power traces of user browsing, we
used a custom Chrome extension (see Section 4.4.1) to collect at least 90 consecutive
traces of each page. For webpages that require users to log in before displaying useful
information, we logged in as the ﬁrst author. We believe that our choice to consider
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Figure 4.3: The top 50 websites according to Alexa in terms of percentage of global
estimated page views.

front pages is reasonable because users are likely to visit the front page of a given
website and then follow links to other pages. The notable exceptions to this tendency
are bookmarked pages and direct links from other people or sites.
We evaluate our classiﬁer’s performance using standard metrics from machine
learning. In the following deﬁnitions, tp and tn refer to true positives and true
negatives (correct labelings), and fp and fn refer to false positives and false negatives
(incorrect labelings).
Precision, tp/(tp + fp), is the fraction of positively labeled examples whose labels
are correct. It measures the classiﬁer’s ability to exclude negative examples.
Recall, tp/(tp + fn), is the fraction of all the examples that should have been positively labeled that are correctly positively labeled. It measures the classiﬁer’s
ability to identify positive examples.
We present experimental results in terms of precision and recall because the standard accuracy metric is potentially misleading. In most of our experiments, the
number of negative examples is roughly 50 times the number of positive examples
because, for each webpage, there are more traces of other webpages in the testing
set than there are of that webpage. Because of this disparity between positive and
negative examples, the classiﬁer could achieve greater than 98% accuracy by simply
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classifying all examples as negative. A perfect classiﬁer would achieve 100% accuracy, 100% precision, and 100% recall. For any imperfect classiﬁer, there is a tradeoﬀ
between precision and recall.
4.4.1

Experimental Setup

This section describes the experimental setup we used to capture AC power traces.
Using an instrumented outlet (described in Section 2.2), we measured the power
consumption of two Apple MacBook computers, a Lenovo T410 laptop, and a Dell
Vostro desktop PC, all running diﬀerent operating system versions. Table 4.1 contains
detailed hardware and software speciﬁcations. To approximate the environments of
typical users, we used a stock installation of each operating system. In particular,
we allowed default background processes to run. Experiments with the two MacBook
computers were carried out approximately one year apart using similar but nonidentical instrumented outlets.
Computers used in experiments
MacBook-1: 2008 model, dual-core Intel Core 2 Duo processor, 4 GB of RAM
Intel GMA X3100 GPU, 80 GB Corsair SATA II MLC solid-state drive
Mac OS 10.6.8. Battery removed.
MacBook-2: 2008 model, dual-core Intel Core 2 Duo processor, 4 GB of RAM
Intel GMA X3100 GPU, 320 GB SATA magnetic drive, and Mac OS 10.7.3
Battery remained in during all experiments.
Dell Vostro desktop: quad-core Intel Core i5 processor, 4 GB of RAM
AMD Radeon 6450 GPU, and 250 GB SATA magnetic drive, tested under
Windows 7 and Ubuntu 10.04.
Lenovo T410 laptop: Intel Core i5 processor, 4 GB of RAM
300 GB SATA magnetic drive, Windows 7.
Battery remained in during all experiments.
Table 4.1: Hardware and software descriptions of the computers used in this work.

To record each workload’s power signature, we monitored electrical current between the power supply and an instrumented outlet. To measure a power supply’s
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instantaneous current on the hot–neutral circuit, we placed a 0.1 Ω sense resistor
(part #13FR100E-ND) in series with one terminal of a standard US outlet. We attached an Agilent U2356A data acquisition unit (DAQ) to the terminals of the sense
resistor. The DAQ samples the voltage across its probes and sends the data via USB
to another PC (not the computer being measured). We recorded 16-bit samples at a
rate of 250 kHz to capture workload artifacts occurring at up to 125 kHz.
Finally, we developed a Chrome extension to automate the repeated loading of a
target webpage. The extension repeatedly: opens a new window, pauses, loads the
page, pauses again, and ﬁnally closes the window. For webpages that did not require
user credentials, the script opened browser windows in a private browsing mode to
purge the browser environment of confounding cached data. To compare webpage
identiﬁability across browsers, we also used the iMacros extension for Firefox [2] to
mimic our Chrome extension. We recorded continuously with the DAQ while running
experiments. A script with knowledge of the browser extensions’ timings chopped
the DAQ’s output into separate trace ﬁles to be used with our classiﬁer. While the
majority of the webpages we proﬁled show no changes within the measurement period,
there are notable exceptions. A number of high-turnover webpages including cnn.com,
cnet.com, and reddit.com underwent content changes during our measurements.

4.5

Evaluation

This section summarizes our experimental results over a wide range of conditions.
While there are a limitless number of questions to ask about how well a classiﬁer
works under diﬀerent conditions, we have distilled them down to the following six
questions regarding causality and intuition:
• How eﬀectively can the SVM classiﬁer diﬀerentiate webpages from one another?
(Section 4.5.1)
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• How does sampling rate aﬀect classiﬁcation? (Section 4.5.5)
• How robust is the classiﬁer in the presence of content distribution services, encryption, and caching, as well as changes in network location, type, or interface?
(Section 4.5.2)
• How is classiﬁer performance aﬀected by changes in operating system or hardware? (Section 4.5.3)
• How does the classiﬁer’s performance change when the test traces include background activities? (Section 4.5.4)
• How well does the classiﬁer exclude samples of pages outside the corpus? (Section 4.5.6)
We ﬁnd that our classiﬁer can diﬀerentiate webpages with high precision and recall
rates (each averaging 99%) and that it is robust against many of the variations we
tested, including the use of a VPN, and changes in the location or network interface.
It is not robust against changes of machine or operating system. Where our classiﬁer
performs poorly, we ﬁnd in most cases that increasing the diversity of the training
set improves its performance along all metrics. The total number of power traces we
tested across all experiments was 13, 110, chronicling over 100 hours of 250 kHz trace
recordings.
4.5.1

Page diﬀerentiation

Our SVM classiﬁer eﬀectively diﬀerentiates among the 51 popular webpages we
tested. As a baseline for classiﬁer performance, we varied only the webpage under test
and held all other variables constant. These other variables include machine under
test, network location, network interface, operating system, and web browser. By
varying only the webpage under test, we minimize diﬀerences that are not actually
the result of variation among webpages.
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We gathered all of the data for this experiment twice, using slightly diﬀerent
MacBooks and instrumented outlets in diﬀerent locations. We took this step to ensure
that the results were reproducible. Here we present the results of combining the two
data sets into a single corpus. After gathering ∼90 traces for each of the 51 webpages
on each of the MacBooks (for a total of ∼180 traces), we used the experimental
protocol described in Section 4.3.2 to label each trace. Each SVM labels a trace as
either matching or not matching the page for which it was trained. The total size
of the corpus for this experiment was 9, 240 traces. We used half of these traces for
training and the remaining traces for testing. With ∼90 training examples per label,
the SVM classiﬁer achieves an average 99% precision and 99% recall over all webpages
in the data set.
The classiﬁer’s performance did vary among the tested webpages. The precision
and recall were both 100% for 18 of the 51 webpages. The lowest precision for any page
was 93% for skype.com and the lowest recall for any page was 88% for slashdot.org.
A plausible explanation for the classiﬁer’s relatively poor performance on skype.com
is that the front page underwent a signiﬁcant design change between the capture
of our two data sets, which we conﬁrmed by inspecting snapshots from the Internet
Archive Wayback Machine [37]. The poor recall for slashdot.org could be explained
by the high turnover of the front page or inconsistent load times. godaddy.com, which
uses a commercial content distribution service, also yielded lower recall results.
4.5.2

Diverse browsing conditions

We varied the conditions under which our browser operated and found that the
SVM classiﬁer is robust against local network connection type, use of cache, VPN
encryption, and the passage of time for most webpages. It is not robust against the
use of a caching content-distribution network (CDN) such as Coral [27].
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Our training and testing setup was as follows. We repeated this process for
three webpages: one simple page (google.com) and two complex pages (cnn.com
and cnet.com). For each page, we gathered the following sets of traces on one of our
MacBooks:
• Time: Traces gathered a month later, to test how fresh the training set must
be.
• Cache: Traces recorded with a warm browser cache, to test whether the classiﬁer depends on speciﬁc network traﬃc patterns.
• VPN: Traces recorded while connected to a VPN concentrator a 1.5 ms round
trip away (essentially measuring only cryptographic overhead), to test whether
encrypting normal traﬃc would be an eﬀective countermeasure.
• WiFi: Traces recorded while connected to our lab network wirelessly instead
of via wired Ethernet, to test whether the training phase overﬁts the SVMs to
“clean” low-latency wired traﬃc.
• CDN: Traces recorded with web traﬃc passing through the Coral CDN, to test
whether a caching proxy suﬃciently disguises traﬃc.
To test each one of these sets, we trained an SVM on all of the other sets using
only samples from the same MacBook. For example, to test whether the SVM could
correctly label traces in the WiFi set, we trained the SVM on the Time, Cache, VPN,
and CDN sets in addition to the Base set of samples. In contrast to training only
on the Base set, this training approach avoids overﬁtting the SVM to that set. After
training the classiﬁer, we instructed it to classify the traces in the test set.
The only condition that hurt performance, for two of the three webpages, was the
use of the Coral CDN. For cnn.com, the classiﬁer incorrectly labeled all traces from
the Coral set as negatives; for google.com, the classiﬁer incorrectly labeled 45 of 50
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traces as negatives, resulting in a 10% recall rate. The classiﬁer’s poor performance
on Coralized pages illustrates that, while the network interface’s power consumption
may not uniquely determine how a trace is classiﬁed, the network interface may still
alter the timing of characteristic consumption patterns for downstream devices such
as the CPU and GPU that act on its outputs. Another variable that is diﬃcult to
observe is the eﬀect of repeated page loads on the CDN itself. There is no guarantee
that the same node will serve each request and the cache conditions of the node
are unknown. Coralizing cnet.com likely made little diﬀerence in its classiﬁability
because cnet.com is already distributed via a commercial CDN.
The classiﬁer’s performance on traces from the VPN set deserve special attention. They suggest that encryption and decryption, at least as implemented by our
MacBook’s PPTP VPN, have little eﬀect on power-trace classiﬁcation—i.e., the SVM
classiﬁer is robust against VPN encryption.
We also isolated the eﬀect of changes in network location. The Coral results
suggest that changes in latency or throughput alter packet arrival times enough to
thwart the classiﬁer. To test this hypothesis, we created two static pages that do
not have any running scripts or asynchronous content and gathered traces of one
MacBook loading each page in diﬀerent locations. One location had a residential
connection and the other a university research network connection. We then trained
on all pages in the corpus, including samples of the static pages using only one of the
two locations. We tested on samples from the untrained location.
When trained on the residential connection and tested on the university connection, the classiﬁer’s precision and recall were 100% and 73% respectively. This result
shows that the training did not lead to any false negatives for other pages, but was
not able to identify all samples. When we reversed the training and testing locations,
the precision and recall were both 100%. This experiment demonstrates that it is
not always necessary to use or simulate a potential victim’s connection to train an
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eﬀective classiﬁer, but that the network connection’s impact is determined largely by
page content.
4.5.3

Operating system and machine diversity

Training on traces from a single operating system limits the classiﬁer’s eﬀectiveness
to that operating system. However, training on traces from two operating systems
allows the classiﬁer to correctly identify traces gathered using both OSes. To test this
behavior, we gathered traces of google.com and cnn.com using Windows 7 and Linux
(Ubuntu 10.04) on the desktop PC. For both sets of traces, we used the same versions
of the Chrome browser and our custom Chrome extension for test automation. When
trained only on examples from one operating system, the classiﬁer failed to correctly
label traces from the other. The only exception was a single trace of cnn.com loaded
from Linux, which the classiﬁer identiﬁed correctly despite the having been trained
only on examples from Windows 7. When we rearranged the input sets so that each
contained an equal number of traces from each OS, then trained on one of these mixed
sets, the classiﬁer correctly labeled all unlabeled traces from the other mixed set.
Diﬀerences among OSes include system timers, drivers, memory management,
GUI characteristics, and performance tuning. Versions of the same application built
for diﬀerent platforms may also diﬀer in unspeciﬁed ways. All of these diﬀerences may
play roles in diﬀerentiating power-consumption patterns. The above result suggests
that a prospective attacker should collect traces under as many diﬀerent operating
systems as possible.
When we varied both machine and operating system, the SVM classiﬁer failed
to correctly label any traces. We trained an SVM on the MacBook (running Mac
OS 10.7.3) with 50 webpages and tested on the Lenovo laptop (running Windows 7) for
5 webpages (google.com, cnn.com, espn.com, live.com, and youtube.com). Then
switched the roles and trained and tested again. For all webpages, the SVM failed to
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correctly label many traces from one machine when trained only on examples from
the other. The precision and recall never exceeded 10%.
Training on examples from both machines allowed the SVM to classify traces from
both machines accurately: 98.4% precision and 98.2% recall on average for the 5
webpages. This result suggests that, as in the operating system experiment, the
problem lies in the lack of training diversity. In the future, we intend to test this
hypothesis by training an SVM on a small, but diverse, set of machines and then
testing traces from machines that are not represented in the training set.
4.5.4

Background activities

Noting the tendency of users to browse multiple webpages at the same time and
running background processes, we measured the classiﬁer’s sensitivity to background
noise. We chose one of the 51 webpages in our training set—live.com —and loaded
it with combinations of background processes. We collected traces for live.com on a
MacBook when a combination of the following 4 processes were running: gmail.com,
iTunes radio, pandora.com, and a word processor. We collected traces for 8 combinations in total, e.g., only gmail.com; gmail.com, pandora.com, and word processor
together, etc. We trained the SVM with examples for all 51 webpages without any
background process and tested it using the background examples. In all cases, the
classiﬁer was able to classify live.com accurately with 100% precision and 100%
recall.
Even though we only tested one webpage and a small set of background processes, the result suggests that the classiﬁer can be robust against combinations of
background processes. A possible explanation for the classiﬁer’s robustness is that
the background processes do not saturate the CPU load and have little eﬀect on the
GPU load because they are literally in the background and do not draw to the screen.
Quantifying the limits of this robustness will require further investigation.
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Figure 4.4: The average precision and recall across all 51 pages with exponentially
increasing sample rate. The classiﬁer’s performance decreases with sampling rate,
but the precision and recall do not drop below 90% until the sampling rate is less
than 4 kHz, a 60x reduction.

4.5.5

Sampling rate diﬀerentiation

Decreasing the sampling rate at which an instrumented outlet records voltage
would allow for tracing and exﬁltration using simple, low-cost hardware. To understand how robust the classiﬁer is to changes in sampling rate, we repeated the set
of page diﬀerentiation tests, but simulated lower sampling rates by restricting the
set of input features to those representing lower-frequency components. Figure 4.4
compares the results with the original sampling rate against results with simulated
lower sampling rates. Each reduction in sampling rate is by a factor of two.
Reducing the sampling rate by a factor of more than 30 (from 250 kHz to 7.8 kHz)
incurs only a 9% reduction in average precision and recall. These results show that
the lower frequency bands alone contain enough information to accurately classify
webpages. This stands in contrast to the work of Enev et al., which speciﬁcally
targeted changes in power supply switching frequency as an information source [19].
An attacker could likely produce a compact and inexpensive measurement device
capable of mounting successful attacks.
4.5.6

Exclusion of unknown pages

Our classiﬁer reliably identiﬁes pages appearing in the training set, but a practical
attack would require the classiﬁer to reject pages not appearing in the training set
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as well. With training and testing sets that resembled each other, a classiﬁer could
perform equally well in the previous experiments whether it learned to cluster positive
or negative examples. To test the hypothesis that the SVMs learned to cluster only
negative examples during training, we tested them with a set of previously unseen
webpage samples that were not in the training set.
We gathered one trace from each of 441 webpages randomly selected from a list
of 1 million popular pages published by Alexa [4], making sure to remove pages that
were already in the training set. We then tested all 441 pages against all 51 trained
SVMs and measured their false-positive rates. The total false positive rate over all
classiﬁers was 1.6%, leading us to reject the above hypothesis and conclude that the
SVMs correctly learned to cluster positive examples.

4.6

Countermeasures to Limit Leakage

This section sketches several countermeasures to mitigate the threats described in
Section 4.1.1. Hardware and software countermeasures both present inherent tradeoﬀs. Hardware mechanisms that increase design complexity or cost may not ﬁnd
traction with high-volume manufacturers. Software countermeasures that increase
computational work may vitiate energy-eﬃciency measures. Altering workloads to
disguise activity may negatively aﬀect usability or user satisfaction. Eﬀective yet
usable countermeasures remain an open problem.
4.6.1

Software countermeasure: Cover activity

To thwart an eavesdropping adversary, a potential victim may be able to hide a
sensitive task’s power signature by running additional tasks that increase the system’s power consumption, which we call cover activity. Section 4.5.4 shows that
cover activity is not a guaranteed ﬁx. Unless it saturates the available resources by
maximizing systemwide power consumption, a cover task might be easy to ﬁlter or
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subtract from the AC signal. The ElectriSense system oﬀers some evidence that this
subtraction is feasible, even if cover activity is suﬃcient to foil the classiﬁer without modiﬁcation. Because of the shifting noise ﬂoor in typical homes, ElectriSense
identiﬁes dominant frequencies and subtracts background noise in the frequency domain to improve classiﬁcation performance [29]. A random-activity strategy would
likely share the constant-activity strategy’s drawbacks while also potentially leaving
sensitive artifacts unconcealed. A carefully constructed cover task could track the
sensitive task’s activity and attempt to conceal it only during active periods—akin
to jamming in wireless communications—but this targeted approach might still leak
information via a timing side channel.
4.6.2

Software countermeasure: Delays and throttling

We adopt a defensive idea from Song et al. [68]: introducing random delays in
the time domain, which will cause changes in the frequency domain that may confuse
our classiﬁer. The classiﬁer’s poor performance on Coralized pages (see Section 4.5.2)
suggests that delays complicate classiﬁcation. The problem with random delays, as
Song et al. point out, is that diﬀerent instances of the same private signal, with
diﬀerent random delays added to each, give an attacker enough information to learn
the true timing of the signal by simply averaging the delays. The same problem
aﬄicts the defensive strategy of randomizing the order in which the browser loads
page elements. A more eﬀective method of concealing true timing information is to
batch activity into discrete buckets that are activated (or sent) at a steady rate no
matter what.
4.6.3

Hardware countermeasure: Current ﬁltering

Filtering circuitry that damps current ﬂuctuations could prevent workload-dependent
information from leaking onto the AC power line. SMPSes internally implement lowpass ﬁlters to remove high-frequency noise and meet government EMI standards. Our
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experiments reveal that, for the SMPSes we tested, the frequencies useful for classiﬁcation are below the internal ﬁlter’s cutoﬀ. A more aggressive low-pass ﬁlter or
a high-pass ﬁlter could remove additional information, but would likely increase the
cost and physical size of an SMPS. Our sampling rate experiments show that the
classiﬁer is eﬀective until the maximum observable frequency drops below 4 kHz, so
much more ﬁltering would likely be required.

4.7

Related Work

This work focuses on classifying run-time events on the order of seconds on a
general-purpose computer, in contrast to previous work that measured on–oﬀ transitions at a large granularity from a household vantage point. Unclassiﬁed research on
recognizing activity by measuring AC power goes back to at least 1989, when Hart proposed nonintrusive load monitoring (NILM) to map changes in total household power
consumption to appliance activations [32, 31]. Hart also recognized the potential for
abuse of NILM techniques. Recently, Gupta et al. proposed ElectriSense, a nonintrusive system that uses a single-point monitor to detect electromagnetic interference
(EMI) generated by consumer electronics’ switched-mode power supplies [63, 29].
Analyzing frequency-domain power signatures, ElectriSense advanced prior work by
detecting nearly simultaneous device activation. Both NILM and ElectriSense eﬀectively capture and identify on and oﬀ events at the device level, but neither aims to
infer the internal states of integrated commodity devices such as personal computers,
as our work does.
Enev et al. reﬁned the ElectriSense concept by studying the correlation of EMI
with video signals being played on modern high-deﬁnition televisions [19]. Their classiﬁer isolates the television’s power supply switching speed as a feature and classiﬁes
signals (video segments) more than 15 minutes long. In comparison, we focus on
classifying signals containing shorter periods of activity and monitor comparatively
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complex general-purpose hardware. Our sensing apparatus is also somewhat simpler,
relying on a single sense resistor and no hardware ﬁltering.
Wang presented the Shazam system, which uses spectral ﬁngerprinting to identify
short (∼10 second) audio clips [80]. Shazam extracts ﬁngerprints by selecting local
maxima in spectrograms and ﬁnds the closest matching ﬁngerprint in a pre-trained
database. Like our work, Shazam is robust to typical noise sources. Unlike our work,
the source signal (audio clip) on which Shazam operates is explicitly intended to carry
information and to sound similar regardless of which device transmits it.
Past work has, like ours, exploited side channels to learn sensitive information
from traﬃc that may be encrypted. From previous work we borrow the intuition that
webpages induce characteristic activity patterns that are robust against encryption
and the passage of time. Several researchers have trained classiﬁers on encrypted or
obfuscated web traﬃc and observed that they could match webpages against their
training set using only packet-length information [33, 52, 54, 70]. Our classiﬁer uses
AC power traces as input rather than network traces, and so observes a noisier,
aggregate side channel.
Our classiﬁer performs analysis in the frequency domain, unlike time-domain classiﬁers that take temporal context into account when trying to identify a component
signal. For example, recent work by White et al. on classifying VoIP packet sequences
into spoken phonemes demonstrated that a trained classiﬁer with knowledge of language properties can reconstruct textual content from encrypted VoIP streams with
surprising accuracy [82].
Our work focuses on leakage via a wired channel, unlike many past works that focus on leakage via parasitic modulation. Looking at CRT monitors, van Eck published
the ﬁrst unclassiﬁed side channel analysis work, demonstrating that the screen image
could be reconstructed remotely using a TV receiver and hand-tuned oscillators [77].
Kuhn further analyzed leakage from CRT and LCD monitors based on parasitic mod-
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ulation [48, 49, 50]. More recently, Vuagnoux and Pasini also investigated leakage via
parasitic modulation, though they targeted keyboards rather than monitors and detached their laptop power supplies to avoid interference [78]. Barisani and Bianco
independently demonstrated keystroke recovery for PS/2 keyboards by attaching a
resistor to the AC power cable, as in our work. They focus only on information from
the keyboard and rely on the observation of high-speed switching speciﬁed by the
PS/2 protocol [7].
Our methods are not designed to ﬁnd key material, unlike past work studying
DC circuits that required pin-level access to components or detailed knowledge of
the circuits under test. Kocher et al. summarize much of the abundant research on
timing and power side channels [43, 44]. The most straightforward of these attacks
measures a small portion of the complete system and uses domain knowledge to infer
the information being processed. This type of attack requires physical access to
the system, knowledge of the cryptosystem under attack, and thousands of accurate
measurements of the same process.

4.8
4.8.1

Discussion
Alternative tracing methods

In our experiments, we physically connect probes to an AC circuit to trace electrical activity. An ancillary goal of this work is to demonstrate that it is possible to
covertly modify a power outlet, so physical contact with the computer’s power cord
is a reasonable expectation under our threat model. However, less-invasive methods
exist to measure the current along the power cable. In particular, a Hall eﬀect sensor,
which measures current via the magnetic ﬁeld around a wire, could provide a way to
trace power consumption if modifying the outlet is infeasible. Such an eavesdropper
could easily be removed when not in use. We have not tested our classiﬁer against
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traces captured with a Hall eﬀect sensor, but we have conﬁrmed that Hall eﬀect
sensors matching our sense resistor’s sensitivity exist.
Another possibility is indirect measurement similar to that of Enev et al. [19]:
connecting measurement equipment in parallel with the victim on the same electrical
circuit but on a diﬀerent outlet. We expect classiﬁcation performance to decline
because of the higher noise ﬂoor, but measurements might reveal that traces from
outside the victim’s outlet are qualitatively good enough for an attacker to use.
4.8.2

Adding classiﬁcation features

The current SVM classiﬁer relies solely on a coarse-grained Fourier transform to
learn unique webpage features. There are many promising extensions to the feature
space that could improve classiﬁcation performance. One simple extension would be
to increase the resolution of the Fourier transforms used to train and test the classiﬁer.
Doing so would increase the dimensionality of the feature space, and possibly the
classiﬁer’s ability to distinguish among webpages.
An extension that takes advantage of SMPS load characteristics would be to simultaneously sample both voltage and current. As Section 2.2.1 discusses, SMPSes
pull the voltage and current waveforms out of phase in a way that is related to the
workload. The changing relationship between the voltage and current waveforms over
time may reveal more information about the state of the system that is orthogonal
to raw current consumption.
Another promising extension is the addition of higher-level features, such as an
estimate of how many characters the user typed immediately before navigating to a
webpage. While our AC measurements do not reveal user keystrokes in most cases,
the address bars of many modern browsers oﬀer an opportunity: when they attempt
to do URL completion or even DNS prefetching [47, 18] as a user types, the activity
creates distinct spikes of CPU activity after each keystroke. Figure 4.5 illustrates
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Figure 4.5: Text boxes that trigger CPU activity with each key press yield extra
information on the AC power channel. In this trace from Chrome on our MacBook,
it is visually evident how many keys we pressed. Even a rough estimate could be used
to inform a webpage classiﬁer.

that the spikes are distinct in the time domain. Augmenting the classiﬁer with a
URL length estimate could eliminate obviously bad matches.

4.9

Summary

This chapter demonstrates that a computer’s AC power consumption reveals sensitive information about computing tasks, speciﬁcally the webpage that the computer
is loading. We designed methods for webpage identiﬁcation that extract power consumption signatures that are obscure in the time domain but more apparent in the
frequency domain. With a data set of over 13, 000 power traces of 51 popular webpages, our trained classiﬁer can correctly label unseen traces with 99% precision and
99% recall. The power trace signatures are robust against several variations including
the use of an encrypting VPN, background processes, changes in network location, or
even the use of a diﬀerent computer.
This is the ﬁrst work that quantiﬁes the degree to which information about browsing activity leaks via the AC power supply. We believe it represents an early step in
understanding this side channel. The increasing dynamic range of hardware power
consumption will lead to further information leakage. Open research problems include
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the design and evaluation of countermeasures to mitigate the privacy risks of using
untrusted power infrastructure.
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CHAPTER 5
POWER ANALYSIS FOR MALWARE DETECTION

Power side channels pose privacy risks to many platforms, and there is abundant
work demonstrating attacks, as discussed in Chapter 4. Comparatively little work has
considered the possibility of improving security or privacy with power side channels,
proposing its use for malware detection on mobile phones [53, 42], or to detect software
theft in embedded systems. [10]. This chapter applies systemwide power analysis
to safety-critical embedded systems — presenting PowerTrip, a novel nonintrusive
malware and anomaly detection system.
PowerTrip addresses the problem of malware on embedded devices that cannot
be protected with traditional software- or network-based techniques. This chapter
answers the following questions:
• To what classes of devices does systemwide power analysis apply as an anomaly
detection mechanism?
• How eﬀective is PowerTrip relative to existing approaches?
• How is performance aﬀected by testing against malware samples for which
PowerTrip has not been trained?
We ﬁnd that PowerTrip applies to a variety of safety-critical embedded devices
and, without requiring any software or internal hardware modiﬁcations, matches
the performance of the state-of-the-art in behavior-based malware detection. When
trained and tested on samples of the same malwares, PowerTrip achieves at least 94%
accuracy on each of the devices we tested.
56

5.1

Introduction

Embedded systems perform critical functions in settings from industrial facilities
to automobiles to medical devices. An emerging trend is that embedded devices
are increasingly connected to other devices—and therefore increasingly exposed to
malware [1, 74]. The U.S. Food and Drug Administration has recently acknowledged
these risks by issuing a safety communication concerning cybersecurity [75].
Unfortunately, many embedded devices are incompatible with conventional softwarebased anti-malware mechanisms such as antivirus (AV) programs or networked intrusiondetection systems (NIDS). Traditional embedded devices commonly lack operating
systems or network stacks, and they are subject to severe resource constraints that
preclude the use of traditional protections. Recently discovered malware infecting
supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems [22] has challenged the
assumption that these resource constraints protect against malfunctions.
On the other end of the device spectrum, “embedded” devices based on oﬀ-theshelf OSes—a practice that gives these devices access to ﬁlesystems, network stacks,
and so forth “for free”—are commonly oﬀ limits to their owners because manufacturers will not support third-party software. Some manufacturers even proscribe software
updates [9]. The fundamental tension for owners of these devices is that they can
have the devices they need to perform critical functions, but they cannot adequately
protect the devices using conventional, software-based means.
In light of the above problems, it is desirable for owners to be able to verify that an
embedded device is performing only its stated duties, and performing them properly—
not, for example, joining a botnet or thrashing a subcomponent. Performing this
veriﬁcation nonintrusively—without requiring that manufacturers change software or
hardware—is the primary challenge.
A key observation is that many embedded devices perform simple, repetitive functions, such as periodically actuating an electrical relay, controlling a pump, or col-
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Figure 5.1: Unlike existing malware detection systems, PowerTrip requires no hardware or software modiﬁcations to the embedded system under test. Safety-critical
embedded systems undergo strict validation processes that make it very diﬃcult to
add third party software in practice to anything in the validated space. PowerTrip
operates on its own terms outside of the validated space.

lecting sensor readings. Even devices based on oﬀ-the-shelf OSes typically perform
simple functions implemented as applications on top of the client software rather than
in ﬁrmware. In both cases, the externally visible state space is small.
This chapter addresses the challenge of malware on embedded systems by introducing PowerTrip, a nonintrusive monitoring system for embedded devices. PowerTrip
relies on the side channel of systemwide power consumption, which leaks information
about the system’s computing activity. It is well suited to embedded systems because
of their typically constrained state spaces, which manifest as a small set of discrete
power-consumption levels.
Designers of trustworthy systems typically seek to eliminate side channels on principle, because of well-documented risks such as key disclosure or unintentional leakage
of private information. Components’ power consumption as an undesirable side channel is well established [44, 19, 14]. However, in addition to sensitive information, side
channels can also leak constructive information. Many computing devices exhibit
systemwide power consumption that scales closely with their workloads. Systemwide
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power consumption, as a proxy for computing activity, can be used to nonintrusively
detect problems, including malware. Figure 5.1 gives a high-level overview of how
PowerTrip works.
5.1.1

Contribution

This chapter’s contribution is PowerTrip, a machine-learning–based system that
monitors the behavior of embedded systems by analyzing systemwide power consumption. We test PowerTrip on three types of embedded hardware: a programmable logic
controller (PLC); a PC-based SCADA substation computer; and a pharmaceutical
compounder, a Windows-based medical device. In each case, we trained PowerTrip’s
classiﬁers on both normal and abnormal behavior, and later tested on unlabeled
samples of both behaviors. PowerTrip correctly distinguished between the two with
greater than 98% accuracy on the PLC and substation computer, and greater than
94% accuracy on the compounder—comparing favorably to the 55% detection rate
of a commercial antivirus product and the 86% detection rate of a recent behaviorbased malware detector [26], yet without requiring software or hardware changes. For
PLCs not based on oﬀ-the-shelf operating systems, this work ﬁlls a gap by providing malware detection where none existed, addressing the risk of targeted attacks
like Stuxnet. For SCADA and medical hardware based on oﬀ-the-shelf computers
and OSes, PowerTrip provides a malware-detection scheme that is less intrusive than
conventional antivirus products.
5.1.2

Lessons Learned

Using PowerTrip as a starting point, this chapter oﬀers the following broader
lessons that may apply to other domains:
• Systemwide power consumption, which typically causes privacy anxieties from
users, can be constructively used for anomaly detection, especially for systems
with dedicated tasks.
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• Using supervised learning approaches, our study of PowerTrip shows that poweranalysis-based classiﬁers can be trained on limited types of anomaly power
traces, and yet be able to detect new or unknown malware, precluding the
requirement of malware signature updates.
• Although PowerTrip is currently a prototype system that operates oﬄine, our
empirical results indicate that power traces can be processed quickly enough to
be deployed as a “live” malware detector.

5.2

Vulnerable Embedded Systems

Embedded systems play a vital role in many operations, from SCADA deployments that control physical infrastructure to manufacturing ﬂoors to hospitals. These
systems are commonly “hands oﬀ” for customers, i.e., they prohibit customers from
changing software conﬁgurations, for several reasons. First, manufacturers are unwilling to support software that they did not install and have not validated. Second,
customers are disinclined to risk breaking systems that are working, when defending
against unclear threats has an unclear beneﬁt. Third, many devices use specialized
hardware and software that may not match customers’ assumptions.
The key challenge to resolving the tension between functionality and the need to
protect increasingly connected devices is ﬁnding a way to monitor devices’ behavior
without modifying them. More speciﬁcally, given a device that may contract malware,
the challenges are: (1) inferring the device’s state without instrumenting or otherwise
modifying it; (2) recognizing deviations from these acceptable states, ideally without
a database of known deviations; and (3) minimize the operational burden by avoiding
misclassiﬁcations.
This section describes two examples of embedded systems—SCADA systems and
medical devices—and outlines the threats that malware poses to them.
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Device

Power Conﬁguration

Siemens
S7
DC/DC/DC PLC

1214C

Siemens
S7
AC/DC/RLY PLC

1214C

DC

No OS, MCU, several KB ROM

AC

No OS, MCU, several KB ROM

Baxa ExactaMix 2400
compounder

AC

WinXP Embedded, Via 664 MHz ,
512 MB RAM

Schweitzer SEL3354
substation computer

AC

WinXP Embedded, Athlon 2600+,
2 GB RAM

Table 5.1: Devices against which we tested PowerTrip.

5.2.1

SCADA Systems

PLCs, described in Chapter 3, are ubiquitous in industrial and commercial automation settings, where they read sensors and control actuators. PLC ﬁrmware
programs are structured as loops, each iteration of which encodes I/O or computation. PLCs traditionally run a single ﬁrmware program without a multitasking
OS underneath. A typical PLC comprises a power supply, a CPU, and I/O modules
that contain solid-state relays, transistors, and digital–analog conversion components.
After an operator loads compiled ﬁrmware onto the PLC via a temporary wired connection, the ﬁrmware program runs as soon as the PLC is powered.
The Stuxnet malware famously targeted PLCs, covertly changing operating instructions on their way from a programming environment to the PLC, apparently
with the intent of causing physical damage [22].
A substation computer is a “ruggedized” commodity PC that uses custom protocols to control PLCs via an array of communication ports, while communicating
with a larger network via Ethernet or similar. Substation computers typically run
“embedded” versions of mainstream OSes.
This chapter focuses on PLCs and substation computers because both perform
relatively few tasks at once, simplifying the task of nonintrusive monitoring, yet they
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also form the backbone of infrastructure systems. For this work, we tested AC- and
DC-powered variants of a common PLC, and a substation computer running Windows
XP Embedded.
5.2.2

Medical Devices

The category of medical devices encompasses a variety of clinical and therapeutic
systems. Over half of these devices include software [24], and many have proven vulnerable to garden-variety viruses and malware [72]. Many vulnerable medical devices
are directly responsible for patient care, including tissue oximeters, fetal monitors,
and pharmaceutical compounders [1].
For this work, we tested a pharmaceutical compounder (Figure 5.2) we obtained
from an auction. A compounder mixes precise amounts of liquid ingredients according
to pharmaceutical formulations. The compounder runs Windows XP Embedded and
custom mixing software. It includes a network port for loading formulations from the
network in multi-compounder environments. It also includes specialized hardware to
support its mixing function, including a pump driven by an electrical motor, pressure
sensors, and a scale to ensure that mixtures meet weight expectations.
The manufacturer expressly advises against the installation of software updates or
other typical protections [9]. According to a security whitepaper by the manufacturer,
owners of the compounder should take some precautions, namely a dedicated ﬁrewall
and subnet per device [9].1
The burden of installing a ﬁrewall for each device, and the risk of the ﬁrewall interfering with device communication, highlight the need for new approaches to security
in this domain. Anecdotal evidence from a U.S. Department of Veteran’s Aﬀairs (VA)
1
The instance of the ExactaMix software on the compounder we tested included network paths
(for logﬁles, etc.) indicating that the compounder had been connected to a Windows network.
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Figure 5.2: Running on Windows XP Embedded SP2, our Baxa ExactaMix 2400
pharmaceutical compounder is an automated embedded system that mixes liquids to
individual speciﬁcations for intravenous parenteral nutrition.

database suggests that this burden raises the bar too high for IT administrators [67].
The VA database recorded 207 conﬁrmed malware infections over a 35-month period despite IT administrators following the advice of manufacturers to keep devices
separate; the network implements thousands of ACLs and uses VLANs extensively.
5.2.3

Threat Model

Because they incorporate both embedded and general-purpose computing devices,
both SCADA and medical systems are subject to malware targeting generic oﬀ-theshelf systems and to more-speciﬁc targeted malware akin to Stuxnet [12, 22].
SCADA or medical systems are exposed to malware if any node on the network
can accept outside inputs from, e.g., the Internet or a USB memory stick. Computers
running oﬀ-the-shelf operating systems are of particular concern because they are
susceptible to un-targeted as well as targeted malware.
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PowerTrip seeks to detect targeted and untargeted attacks, but relies on the assumption that an attacker cannot completely replicate both the system under attack
and PowerTrip. Such an adversary with detailed knowledge of the defense mechanisms can design an attack speciﬁcally to thwart or evade them. Fortunately, these
adversaries appear to be rare; we know of no targeted attacks against medical devices
in the wild, and only a few examples of targeted SCADA malware have been publicly
acknowledged. Using a system like PowerTrip to detect such attacks would require
complete knowledge of the system input and outputs, as well as the control ﬂow, to
verify state transitions. Cárdenas et al.propose a system with the required device
visibility, but their work relies on hardware instrumentation of all system inputs and
outputs [11].
Unlike sophisticated targeted attacks, garden-variety malware is a clear and present
danger to both medical and SCADA systems [46, 74, 72] and also has the potential
to halt industrial operations or interfere with patient care by saturating system resources, causing system restarts, or breaking installed software.
For a PLC, we assume an attacker may obtain the source code to a PLC’s ﬁrmware,
then modify it at any time. An attacker may also change the set of inputs and outputs
(read or write extra ports), the values they read or write, and the timings of their
outputs.
For a substation computer or a medical device running oﬀ-the-shelf software, we
assume an attacker may use software exploits to gain administrator-level access.
We assume that devices are initially shipped without malware. We also assume
that adversaries do not have physical access to the SCADA facility at any time,
since the computer systems are perhaps less of a target than the physical systems
themselves if an attacker is inside the facility.
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5.3

Monitoring Device Behavior with Power Analysis

All of the devices discussed in the previous section share two key properties that
make them amenable to nonintrusive monitoring: (1) they perform well-deﬁned,
repetitive tasks that should exhibit little variation from run to run; and (2) they
draw power from a power outlet. The power outlet can serve as a monitoring point
for unmodiﬁed hardware. Taking advantage of power outlets as monitoring points,
PowerTrip interprets aggregate systemwide power consumption as a side channel to
determine whether a device stays within the set of states that are correlated with
acceptable behavior.
5.3.1

PowerTrip design goals

Previous sections have detailed the motivation for PowerTrip’s design. We set the
following explicit design goals for PowerTrip:
1. Monitor power nonintrusively—do not require device modiﬁcations, network
connection, or intrude upon their operation.
2. Work well across a variety of systems—AC and DC as well as diﬀerent kinds of
devices.
3. Meet or exceed the malware-detection rate of software-based antivirus products.
To meet the ﬁrst goal, PowerTrip operates exclusively outside the device being
monitored, and takes read-only power measurements of which the device is unaware.
To meet the second goal, PowerTrip adopts a machine-learning approach that adapts
to each device being measured. Section 5.5 shows that PowerTrip meets the third
goal.
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Figure 5.3: A trace of DC power consumption (top) allows inference of a simple state
machine for a PLC. Deviations from these states may indicate a malware infection.

5.3.2

Inferring State Machines

Many SCADA and medical devices act as black boxes from an operational perspective, with only their inputs and outputs visible at run time. Accurately determining
these devices’ states is a matter of inference rather than observation.
An appealing option is to directly learn a device’s state machine by observing all
of its inputs and outputs during training executions, an approach Cárdenas advocates [11]. While such an approach may work for a given PLC, a key drawback is
that it requires custom physical instrumentation for each device and a custom set
of classiﬁcation features corresponding to the particular conﬁguration of inputs and
outputs.
An operationally simpler alternative is to monitor power nonintrusively, without
modifying the device being measured. Because the devices we studied are plugged into
a power source, and their power consumption scales with their computing activities,
observing systemwide power consumption at the power source gives an aggregate view
of device activity that maps to the system’s constrained state space.
Figure 5.3 depicts the inference of a state machine from a power trace. Assuming
that the trace is representative of the device’s correct operation, a simple automatic
mechanism could infer that (1) correct behavior is periodic (with a correct period
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ΔT ), and (2) the device’s instantaneous power consumption should match one of a
few values.
A general-purpose computer is complicated in the sense that it has a tremendous
number of possible states. We assume that fully inferring the internal state of a
computer by inspecting its power consumption is impractical in the general case.
However, control systems that run industrial or medical applications are typically
dedicated to a single application per machine, eﬀectively constraining the state space
to the application’s.
Thanks to this simpliﬁcation of the state space, we can characterize normal behavior for the industrial-control and medical systems we examine in this work.
• A PLC exhibits periodic behavior with period at most the time between one
loop iteration and the next, or it performs a function to transform its inputs
into outputs.
• A substation computer periodically collects information from PLCs via wired
interfaces, and periodically reports information to higher-level systems.
• A compounder stores chemical recipes (possibly on network shares), mixes
chemicals, and veriﬁes the output. It also supports “ﬂushing” to clear its ﬂuid
channels of trace chemicals.
Activities other than these may appear in traces of the whole system’s power consumption, in which case a classiﬁer can ﬂag them as unusual.
While these state descriptions may seem simplistic, the devices we consider have
narrow intended purposes. In the case of the compounder, a single custom application
opens full-screen at system launch and is intended to be the only user interface to the
device. Outside of variations in the mixed chemicals, there are few user interactions
that should aﬀect power consumption.
For a concrete example of normal versus abnormal behavior, Figure 5.4 depicts several power traces of a substation computer running Windows XP Embedded. At idle,
67

(Figure 5.4(a)), the system’s power consumption is constant (modulo some noise).
However, after contracting the widespread “Ramnit” virus that attempts to join a
botnet (Figure 5.4(b)), its power consumption at idle periodically exceeds the normal
range. Under the control of a diﬀerent piece of malware, the power consumption at
idle exhibits more-pronounced periodic behavior (Figure 5.4(c)).
5.3.3

AC versus DC

Both alternating-current (AC) and direct-current (DC) power are in widespread
use in SCADA installations, so PowerTrip employs classiﬁcation strategies for traces
of both kinds. The AC classiﬁcation strategies apply to medical devices, which tend to
use AC power throughout because of the wide variety of separately sourced equipment
they must support.
A DC power trace is a sequence of levels with step changes between them, and
is amenable to relatively simple pattern-matching approaches that map to intuitive
concepts. An AC power trace is a 60 Hz periodic signal that undergoes amplitude
and phase distortions in response to changes in consumption. Amplitude changes are
more prominent than phase changes because they are directly proportional to power
consumption. Phase changes are not directly proportional to consumption, but are
instead artifacts of power supply switching ineﬃciency. Because switching and eﬃciency are both related to consumption levels, phase changes are still correlated with
load. AC traces are not amenable to simple pattern-matching because of periodicity
and phase misalignments. Because of this, our techniques for AC power traces do not
rely on any distance metrics that rely on precise alignment.
5.3.4

Recognizing Deviations

Antivirus scanners identify malware using signature matching to identify unknown
code specimens, requiring an exact (rather than heuristic) match to known malware
for a specimen to be ﬂagged as suspicious. The major limitation to this approach is
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(a) Idle

(b) Idle after infection
with “Ramnit” malware

(c) Idle after infection
with custom malware that
captures a screenshot
every 5 seconds

Figure 5.4: AC power traces collected on a substation computer running Windows
XP Embedded in a SCADA testbed.

the need to create and distribute signatures for each piece of malware before it becomes widespread. Furthermore, recent work has demonstrated that signature-based
antivirus scanners are easily fooled by simple mutations to known malware [38], resulting in false negatives. In the settings we consider, excessive false negatives may have
damaging repercussions. For this reason, and also because signature databases require
frequent updates from online sources, we seek alternatives to the naı̈ve signature-based
approach.
The next section describes a behavior-based approach that oﬀers better detection
rates than commercial antivirus software and does not require the device owner to
periodically update a blacklist.

5.4

Power-Trace Classiﬁcation

PowerTrip monitors systemwide DC or AC power consumption at run time. For
DC power, PowerTrip uses a whitelisting approach (Section 5.4.1) that requires only
traces of normal activity for training. For AC power, which is less amenable to direct
time-series analysis, PowerTrip uses a supervised-learning approach (Section 5.4.3)
that requires traces of normal and abnormal activity.
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5.4.1

Whitelisting for DC Classiﬁcation

DC power distribution is common in industrial environments, in part because it
simpliﬁes machine design (by omitting AC-to-DC transformers). Many PLCs support
DC line power for this reason.
Because of its simple structure, a PLC’s DC power consumption is strongly correlated with its workload. Additionally, predictable, repetitive, deterministic operation
is a primary design goal for PLCs, suggesting that a whitelisting approach is appropriate for recognizing the small, predictable set of known-good states.
5.4.2

Classifying traces

A naı̈ve classiﬁer might accept an expected period for repetition and ﬂag any
departure from that period. Because PLC workloads may or may not be purely periodic, PowerTrip instead uses a hybrid classiﬁcation approach. Given a representative
training trace, the classiﬁer’s ﬁrst stage searches for periodic content. If it ﬁnds periodic content, it chooses a classiﬁcation strategy that searches for the same periodic
content in unlabeled traces. If it fails to ﬁnd periodic content, it switches to a clustering classiﬁer that determines whether samples in an unknown trace fall into the
same range of power levels as training samples. More detail follows.
A common task for PLCs is to control actuators with regularly spaced electric
pulses. The frequency of the pulsed output determines the rate of the actuator,
with one common output type being a stepper motor.2 Our classiﬁcation approach
for these purely periodic workloads is to automatically identify one repetition of the
signal, then try to match this repetition against future traces, as follows:
1. Set n = 1 (begin with a one-sample candidate window).
2

Stuxnet targeted pulsed outputs, increasing the pulse frequency and then abruptly stopping
them in order to damage centrifuges attached to stepper motors [22].
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Figure 5.5: PowerTrip iteratively grows a window to characterize and later check
pulsed outputs.

2. Compare samples {1, . . . , n} from the input trace with the next n samples ({n+
1, . . . , 2n}).
3. If the sum of squared diﬀerences between the two sets of samples is less than a
threshold value T , consider them repetitions of the same signal. If consecutive
copies of the n-sample sequence match the rest of the trace, mark n samples as
the signal’s period. Otherwise, increment n and repeat.
Figure 5.5 illustrates the process.
To test whether an unlabeled trace’s workload matches the periodic workload
identiﬁed in the above way, a simple classiﬁer slides the window of n samples across
a downsampled trace; if it matches at some location, and consecutive copies of the
n-sample window match the rest of the trace with suﬃciently few matching errors,
the classiﬁer outputs a binary matching decision. A result of “no match” indicates
suspicious behavior.
For workloads that are not purely periodic—e.g., those that are determined by
unpredictable inputs—a slightly more complicated approach is appropriate. This
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approach relies on the assumption that, even if the order of power-consumption levels
is unknown, their amplitudes will still fall into a ﬁxed number of categories. For
accurate training, PowerTrip’s approach requires the system under test to enumerate
its state space so that all expected states appear in a training trace.
Given a trace for training, PowerTrip uses a k-means clustering algorithm as follows. First, it calculates an upper bound for k, k̂ corresponding to the maximum
number of power-consumption states. DC power traces do not allow us to discriminate PLC inputs or outputs that use identical hardware (see Section 5.5.3), so the
maximum number of possible states is not equal to all combinations of the input and
output states. The classiﬁer can instead identify how many inputs and how many
outputs are in a high state. The maximum number of states is then n2 for a PLC
with n inputs and n outputs. In the case of the Siemens S7-1200 PLCs, there are 4
inputs and 4 outputs, and thus 16 visible power states.
Having calculated k̂, the classiﬁer sets k = i for each k̂ ≥ i ≥ 2, to see whether
clustering the states into i clusters minimizes the mean squared distance from the
set of points to the set of cluster centroids. PowerTrip sets k to this value of i and
infers that the system’s state machine has k states. (Finding k automatically is an
NP-hard problem, but our iterative method produces the desired k for a PLC’s small
state space.)
After clustering, the trace comprises k probability distributions, each with its own
mean x̂i and standard deviation σi . To classify an unlabeled input trace, which is
a sequence of voltage samples, we iterate through the samples. For each sample s,
we test whether it is within one standard deviation of one of the k means—that is,
whether x̂i − σi ≤ s ≤ x̂i + σi , for any i ∈ {1, . . . , k}. If so, PowerTrip considers
the sample “reasonable.” If 99% of the trace’s samples are reasonable, the classiﬁer
deems the entire trace reasonable. Otherwise, it raises a ﬂag to indicate suspicious
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behavior. (The 99% threshold is somewhat tolerant of noise and time spent in state
transitions, in our experiments.)
5.4.3

Supervised Learning for AC Classiﬁcation

AC power traces are less amenable to classiﬁcation via a whitelisting approach
because the switched-mode power supplies used to convert AC input to DC power introduce noise that can confound matching against time-series signatures. In addition
to noise, general-purpose computers have more-diverse capabilities and correspondingly larger state spaces than single-purpose embedded devices. For these reasons,
PowerTrip uses a supervised-learning approach to AC power classiﬁcation, taking
both negative (normal) and positive (abnormal) training samples.
5.4.4

Choice of classiﬁers

Using implementations from the Weka toolkit [30] and libsvm [13], we tested a
variety of supervised-learning algorithms for AC trace classiﬁcation. PowerTrip uses
the three classiﬁers that worked best in our experiments.
• 3-nearest neighbors (3-NN): Given an n-dimensional feature vector (set of numbers summarizing a power trace), assign it the label that is most represented
among its 3 nearest neighbors in the feature space (from the training set).
• Multilayer perceptron: Train a neural network to recognize properties that characterize the labeled feature vectors in the training set, using backpropagation
of errors to minimize overall error; then pass unlabeled feature vectors to the
neural network and allow the learned edge weights to determine the output class
(normal or abnormal).
• Random forest: A “forest” of decision trees trained on randomly perturbed
feature vectors produce, in aggregate, a single label for an unseen trace by
majority voting.
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All three act as binary classiﬁers that separate normal behavior from abnormal
behavior. For each AC-powered device, PowerTrip splits each power trace into 5second chunks to simulate real-time sampling, then applies stratiﬁed 10-fold cross
validation for training and testing. In the case of a PLC, abnormal behavior could
be any change in ﬁrmware. In the case of a substation computer or other higherlayer SCADA device, we focus on malware as the most interesting type of abnormal
behavior.
The primary advantage of using general-purpose, well-understood supervisedlearning algorithms for AC classiﬁcation is the versatility of the approach: PowerTrip
applies the same choice of features and set of classiﬁers to a PLC, a substation computer, and a medical device without any changes to suit the particular device under
test. This approach also requires negative training samples—in our case, traces of
malware-infected devices. In Section 5.5 we demonstrate that training on samples
of some malware allowed PowerTrip’s AC classiﬁers to recognize samples of other
un-trained malware and aberrant behavior, obviating the need to build an exhaustive
malware signature database during training.
5.4.5

Feature selection and training

After manually examining AC power traces with statistical tools, we selected a
set of time-domain features meant to reﬂect the types of variation that can occur in
an AC signal. While performing routine tasks, we expect the distribution of a power
trace and the mean power consumed to remain relatively constant over short time
periods. Any unexpected software workloads will place extra strain on the hardware,
which will in turn consume additional power and aﬀect feature values. PowerTrip
considers eight time-domain features:
• mean, variance, skewness, kurtosis: the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th moments of the
data.
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• Root mean square (RMS): the square root of the mean squared amplitude;
• The global minimum and maximum values from all samples in a trace;
• Interquartile range (IQR): the diﬀerence between the 75th- and 25th-percentile
values in the trace; and
PowerTrip also uses frequency-domain features. It transforms AC power traces
into the frequency domain using the Fourier transform, producing divisions 250 Hz
wide. It uses the energy in the ten lowest divisions as features representing periodic
content up to 2.5 kHz. Feature f1 represents the energy observed in the interval
between 0 and 250 Hz, f2 covers the interval between 250 Hz and 500 Hz, and so on up
to f10. Our initial experiments indicated that adding more frequency-domain features
did not signiﬁcantly increase the accuracy of the classiﬁers. It did, however, increase
training time which scales with the number of features.
None of the features rely on precise trace alignment. In the case of the timedomain features, PowerTrip calculates them over a window at least 1 second wide,
much wider than the ∼17 ms period of the AC signal. This prevents noise in a single
period from aﬀecting feature values.

5.5

Evaluation

PowerTrip must detect malware with high accuracy, few false positives, and false
negatives. Our evaluation examines the eﬀectiveness of PowerTrip against malware
either known or unknown during training on safety-critical devices including a PLC, a
substation computer, and a compounder. Our results can be summarized as follows:
• When trained on samples of both normal behavior and infections of known
malware, PowerTrip correctly identiﬁes known malware with 99.5% accuracy
for the substation computer and 94% accuracy for the compounder. It correctly
identiﬁes unknown malware with 84.9% accuracy for the substation computer
and 88.5% accuracy for the compounder.
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• PowerTrip’s classiﬁers relying on time- and frequency-domain features can detect when behavioral modiﬁcations (changing frequencies or the number of
inputs or outputs) are made to our test PLC ﬁrmwares with 99% accuracy.
PowerTrip can also reliably detect when a PLC’s ﬁrmware is reﬂashed.
• PowerTrip can be used for real-time classiﬁcation. The AC and DC classiﬁers
can keep pace with the 250 kHz power-trace sample rate; extracting and classifying features as they arrive.
5.5.1

Metrics

PowerTrip uses binary classiﬁers that label samples as normal (“negative”) or
abnormal (“positive”). The following standard performance metrics apply:
Accuracy, tp + tn/ # samples, is the fraction of correctly labeled samples.
Precision, tp/(tp + fp), is the fraction of positively labeled samples whose labels are
correct. It measures the classiﬁer’s resistance to false positives.
Recall, tp/(tp + fn), is the fraction of samples that should have been positively labeled that are correctly positively labeled. It measures the classiﬁer’s resistance
to false negatives.
In the above deﬁnitions, tp and tn refer to true positives and true negatives, and
fp and fn refer to false positives and false negatives. A classiﬁer’s precision and recall
results provide insight into the types of errors the classiﬁer tends to make, rather than
counting only the number of misclassiﬁed samples.
5.5.2

Experimental Setup

Our tracing setup is similar to that of previous work [14, 15] on measuring power
consumption at the power line. For both AC and DC power tracing, the goals of our
equipment design are simplicity and modularity.
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For each DC-powered device we tested, we placed a 3 Ω sense resistor (1% tolerance) in series with the DC power supply. We then used an Agilent U2356A data
acquisition unit (DAQ) to sample and log the voltage drop across the resistor at a
rate of 250 kHz.
The AC tracing setup is conceptually similar to the DC setup. To capture traces
of AC power between a device and the power grid, we instrumented a North American
power outlet. We placed a 0.1 Ω resistor (1% tolerance) in series with the hot terminal
of the outlet. A future version of this hardware could be encapsulated in either an
outlet cover or a small power brick with a pass-through outlet.
Using these AC and DC trace-recording methods, we tested PowerTrip with two
Siemens PLCs, a Schweitzer substation computer, and a Baxa compounder.
5.5.2.1

PLCs

We tested two PLC training kits.One PLC was an S7-1214 DC/DC/DC PLC that
supported pulse-width modulation and pulse-train digital outputs and was powered
by a 24-volt DC supply; the other was an S7-1214 AC/DC/Rly model that supported
analog output scaling and was powered by a standard AC supply.3 As mentioned in
Section 5.4, the AC and DC conﬁgurations required diﬀerent classiﬁcation approaches.
We wrote ladder logic programs created with Siemens Totally Integrated Automation Portal V11 to explore the threat model presented in Section 5.2. Two workloads
implemented simple logic gates (AND and OR). Two others read analog inputs, either actuating an output when the input reached a threshold or displaying the input
value on an analog output. One modulated a pulse-width modulation (PWM) output, the type of signal used to drive peripherals such as stepper motors, at a ﬁxed
frequency. In addition to these workloads, we gathered 20 samples of the PLC’s power
consumption while uploading new code (one of our testing workloads).
3

Stuxnet targeted the S7-200, a similar PLC [22].
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5.5.2.2

Substation computer

We tested a Schweitzer SEL3354 substation computer [66], both at idle and under
a variety of real and simulated malicious workloads. The SEL3354 we tested (circa
2003), was powered via a standard AC outlet, and included an AMD Athlon 64 2600+
processor, 2 GB of RAM, and a Compact Flash card for primary storage. It ran the
manufacturer’s substation software on Windows XP Embedded. The only hardware
diﬀerence from an oﬀ-the-shelf computer is the addition of 16 RS-232 serial ports
intended for use with devices such as PLCs.
We gathered AC power traces of the substation computer under a variety of workloads that represent a range of activity, including idling, rebooting, infected with our
emulated malware, and infected with real malware samples.
We were unable to proﬁle the substation computer while it was communicating
with PLCs because of a lack of available compatible hardware at the SCADA testbed.
However, the Schweitzer software was running at all times.
5.5.2.3

Compounder

To evaluate our technique on medical equipment, we purchased a Baxa ExactaMix
2400 compounder via an auction. The model we tested runs the manufacturer’s compounder software on Windows XP Embedded 2002 Service Pack 2. The compounder
has a 664 MHz VIA C5 x86 CPU and 496 MB of RAM.
We gathered AC power traces of the compounder running a wide variety of workloads, including idling, booting, shutting down, ﬂushing, compounding 3 mixtures,
infected with our emulated malware, and infected with real-world malware samples
(Section 5.5.5.1).
5.5.3

Change Detection for DC-Powered PLCs

Inspired by Stuxnet, which manipulated a PLC-controlled motor’s switching frequency, we tested whether PowerTrip’s sliding-window approach (Section 5.4.1) could
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detect changes in the DC PLC’s pulse-output frequency, an example of a perfectly
periodic workload.
For each of 1, 2, 4, 10, and 25 Hz, we trained PowerTrip to whitelist traces of
the PLC outputting pulses at that frequency, then looked for erroneous matches
against traces recorded with other frequencies. PowerTrip distinguished the diﬀerent
frequencies with 100% accuracy for 10-minute samples of each.
To determine the smallest frequency changes the sliding-window approach could
detect, we trained PowerTrip on a trace of 25 Hz pulsed output, then tested traces of
slightly lower frequencies approaching 25 Hz. When the modiﬁed frequency reached
24.94 Hz, representing a diﬀerence in pulse-width period of 100 μs, the classiﬁer detected the frequency shift (i.e., decided the traces were diﬀerent) after 90 pulses—
representing a phase drift of 9 ms. Since a small change in frequency will compound
matching errors over time, PowerTrip should be able to detect arbitrarily small
changes in pulse frequency given at least 9 ms of accumulated drift, and changes
resulting in ≥ 9 ms of phase drift immediately. The maximum frequency supported
by the Siements S7-1200 PLCs is 1 MHz, so maximum number of repetitions possible
before detection is ∼9000, but the malicious workload would only run for 9 ms total.
To measure PowerTrip’s ability to detect changes in a PLC’s I/O behavior (e.g.,
malicious selection of the wrong output for a signal), we applied the k-means clustering approach to the PLC workloads. When trained on any one ﬁrmware, the
classiﬁer could detect changes in the number of inputs with 100% accuracy, but could
not detect changes in which input and output ports were read or actuated. This is
unsurprising given that individual inputs and outputs in fact contain identical relay
hardware. In an industrial control setting, incorrect input or output actuation may
be obvious based on the attached outputs (for example, an HVAC unit could turn on
the heat instead of the air conditioning), but we do not make any assumptions about
attached devices in order to keep our approach general.
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Figure 5.6: During ﬁrmware ﬂash operations, PLC power consumption ﬂuctuates
much more quickly than it does for non-periodic workloads and much more erratically
than it does for pulse outputs.

We also tested 20 traces of PLC reprogramming against all other PLC workloads
that were not reprogramming; PowerTrip’s k-means classiﬁer for nonperiodic workloads correctly identiﬁed all 20 updates as anomalous. Firmware ﬂash traces look
markedly diﬀerent even to the naked eye, as Figure 5.6 illustrates. This experiment
suggests that the k-means classiﬁer has a high probability of detecting suspicious
ﬁrmware updates in real time, even in cases where the new ﬁrmware behaves identically to the old.
5.5.4

Extension to AC-Powered PLCs

We can also apply the histogram classiﬁer to AC-powered PLCs given the assumption that state changes occur at less than 60 Hz. Because we have a detailed model
of DC PLC traces as a series of voltage levels over time, we can transform AC traces
into this form. To evaluate this approach, we took the RMS over a sliding window
4200 samples wide. This eﬀectively low-pass ﬁlters the trace, removing changes that
occur at greater than 60 Hz. After this process, the traces approximate DC power
traces. We tested these pre-processed traces using the k-means clustering approach
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and found that it could detect changes in the number of inputs and outputs with
95.6% accuracy—nearly as accurately as it worked for the DC-powered PLC.
5.5.5

Detecting Known Malware

PowerTrip identiﬁes known malware—malware it was trained to recognize—with
98% mean accuracy across all devices tested.
For training and testing of AC traces, we applied stratiﬁed 10-fold cross validation.
Stratiﬁcation ensures that each fold in the cross validation process contains approximately the same number of normal and abnormal samples, which is important for
repeatable results on biased datasets such as those presented in this chapter.
To evaluate which features best separate samples from each class, we performed
feature ranking on the full data set using the Weka information gain attribute evaluator. The evaluator ranks features based on the mutual information between each
feature and the class label. The mutual information can be calculated as the diﬀerence between the entropy of the feature and the entropy of the feature conditioned on
the class label, expressed as: I(feature; class) = H(feature) − H(feature|class) where
H is the entropy and I the mutual information. Note that this ranking is feature set
dependent, but not classiﬁer dependent.
5.5.5.1

Malware selection

Two types of malware threaten the kinds of embedded devices this chapter considers: targeted malware customized for a speciﬁc device type that aims to inﬂict damage
on speciﬁc targets (but subject to the constraints enumerated in Section 5.2.3), and
nontargeted malware that ﬁnds its way onto oﬀ-the-shelf systems via familiar vectors
(e.g., USB drives).
To test whether our classiﬁers could detect deviations caused by nontargeted malware on the substation computer and compounder, we manually installed twelve of
the most-prevalent malware programs of 2011 and 2012 [71, 57], starting with the
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most prevalent and selecting alternatives when necessary based on sample availability or unsuccessful infection. Each trial began with a “clean” snapshot of the original
system. Table 5.4 lists the samples.
To test detection of common malware archetypes, we also wrote emulated malware
designed to mimic routine misbehavior. Speciﬁcally, we implemented a keylogger, a
pop-up dialog launcher that opens dialog boxes (to emulate adware), and a screen
grabber that saves screenshots at a ﬁxed interval (to emulate common exﬁltration
techniques).
For the AC PLC, PowerTrip should ﬂag any change to ﬁrmware as abnormal, and
thus potentially malicious.
5.5.5.2

Detecting AC PLC Software Changes

To test how PowerTrip’s machine-learning methods apply to simple computers like
AC PLCs, we constructed a binary decision problem where PowerTrip was trained
to identify one ﬁrmware versus all others. The ﬁrmware chosen at random to act
as the “normal” case used an analog output to mirror the voltage level on an analog
input. Our AC PLC dataset includes 363 negative samples and 1768 positive samples.
Table 5.2 summarizes the results. All classiﬁers achieved greater than 99% accuracy.
For the PLC dataset, the top ﬁve features in order were f6, f8, RMS, mean, and f5,
where f n is deﬁned as the energy in the 250 Hz upper-bounded by n × 250 Hz in the
frequency domain. These results show that frequency-domain features provides much
of PowerTrip’s power to diﬀerentiate ﬁrmwares. The switching speed of an AC power
supply scales with power draw, so the relative utility of these features in conjunction
with the RMS and mean suggest that changes in overall power consumption could be
the dominant identiﬁer in AC PLC traces. Manual inspection of the traces reveals that
the PLC’s integrated SMPS creates prominent noise in the 1.5–2 kHz range during
state transitions. Energy in this range is represented by the two highest-ranked
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Classiﬁer

Accuracy

Precision

Recall

100%
99.9%
99.9%

100%
100%
100%

100%
100%
100%

99.5%
99.5%
99.5%

100%
100%
100%

100%
100%
100%

93.6%
94.4%
94.2%

89%
99%
93%

78%
73%
77%

PLC
3-Nearest Neighbors
Multilayer Perceptron
Random Forests
Substation
3-Nearest Neighbors
Multilayer Perceptron
Random Forests
Compounder
3-Nearest Neighbors
Multilayer Perceptron
Random Forests

Table 5.2: PowerTrip distinguishes among our test workloads: accuracy, precision,
and recall for our AC devices when we trained PowerTrip on samples of all of our
test workloads.

features, f6 and f8. From this, we can conclude that changes in power consumption
produce obvious switching frequency changes in PLC power traces.
5.5.5.3

Detecting Substation Aberrations

We gathered samples of the SEL3354 substation computer while running the
Schweitzer software but otherwise idling, rebooting, and running a wide variety of
emulated and authentic malware workloads. The classiﬁcation task was to separate
normal behavior (idle or reboot traces) from abnormal behavior (the malware workloads). Once again, we used stratiﬁed 10-fold cross validation for training and testing.
There were 2634 total samples tested, 364 negative samples and 2270 positive (infected) samples. All three of the classiﬁers performed nearly perfectly, with 99.5%
accuracy and precision and recall both rounding to 100%.
For this data set, we found that the top ﬁve features in order were f3, max, f4,
RMS, and mean. Like the PLC dataset, the highest-ranked features all appear to
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be related to the overall power consumption or frequency components. The speciﬁc frequency-domain features that are ranked highest for the substation computer
are diﬀerent from those ranked highest for the PLC. Given the major hardware and
software diﬀerences between a largely oﬀ-the-shelf platform like the substation computer and a specialized platform like the PLC, diﬀerences in the dominant frequency
components are unsurprising.
5.5.5.4

Detecting Compounder Aberrations

We gathered traces of the ExactaMix compounder while performing a variety of
real-world tasks, booting and shutting down, and while running a wide variety of
emulated and authentic malware workloads. We were able to proﬁle the compounder
while it performed specialized actions including mixing ingredients according to programmed recipes and ﬂushing the ﬂuid inlets. The classiﬁcation task was to separate
normal behavior (deﬁned as idle, booting, shutdown, or compounding tasks) from the
malware workloads. Once again, we used stratiﬁed 10-fold cross validation. There
were 2343 total samples tested, 1845 positive (infected) samples and 497 negative
samples. We used many more positive samples than negative samples because gathering negative samples required manual interaction with the compounder and frequent
solution reﬁlls. In a clinical deployment, regular use would provide a ready source of
negative samples. All three of the classiﬁers achieved at least 93% accuracy. Table 5.2
summarizes the full results. This experiment demonstrates that PowerTrip’s classiﬁers can reliably separate diﬀerent workloads given training samples of all workloads
expected at testing time.
For this dataset, we found that the top ﬁve features in order were mean, RMS,
skewness, variance, and max. Unlike the other datasets, none of the frequency-domain
features appear in the list of top features. Rather, all of the most valuable features
for this dataset pertain to the average power draw and slow-moving changes in that
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Device
Substation comp.
Compounder

Accuracy

Precision

Recall

84.9%
88.5%

98.3%
93.5%

80.8%
92.1%

Table 5.3: Mean accuracy, precision, and recall over 10 runs for the substation and
compounder datasets with malware samples randomly partitioned into two disjoint
sets. One set was used for training and the other for testing.

power draw. The dynamic range of the mixing and ﬂushing traces suggest that the
compounder’s pump is responsible for the relative utility of these features. When
the pump switches on, the compounder’s total power consumption increases by more
than 30%.
5.5.6

Detecting Unknown Malware

PowerTrip identiﬁed unknown malware—unlabeled samples of a malware infection
that were not in the training set—with 84.9% accuracy on the substation computer
and 88.5% on the compounder, which is comparable to the 86% detection rate of a
state-of-the-art behavior-based malware detector [26].
We re-trained PowerTrip on half of the compounder and substation datasets after
removing all samples of half of the real malware variants. We then tested PowerTrip
using only normal samples and those drawn from the malware variants not used at
training time. That is, the malware variants used at training and testing time were
randomly assigned disjoint sets. We partitioned, trained, and tested ten times to
avoid a single biased experiment. Finally, we implemented majority voting among
PowerTrip’s classiﬁers to produce a single label for each sample. This experiment
presents a more realistic deployment scenario, one in which PowerTrip has access to
some malware samples at training time but has not been trained on all of the malicious
workloads seen at testing time. Table 5.3 summarizes the results, which show that
the accuracy decreases by approximately 5% for the compounder and 15% for the

85

Classifier accuracy (%)

Compounder

PLC

100.0

● ●

●

●

Substation Computer

●

● ●

●

●

●

●

97.5

●

Classifier

95.0
92.5

●
●
●

●

●

●

KNN
Perceptron

●

Random.Forest

90.0
0

20

40

60 0

20

40

60 0

20

40

60

Window size (seconds)

Classifier accuracy (%)

Figure 5.7: The eﬀect on accuracy as the size of the window over which features are
calculated increases. Minimizing window size mitigates averaging eﬀects that could
hide malware. 5-second windows produce the highest accuracy for all three datasets.
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Figure 5.8: The eﬀect on accuracy as the number of training samples increases.
For the compounder and substation datasets, real malware samples were included
in training data. The point of diminishing returns appears to be approximately 500
training samples for the PLC and compounder datasets and 1000 for the substation
dataset.

substation computer, but is still comparable to the state-of-the-art in behavior-based
malware detection. The precision is greater than 93% in all cases, meaning that
PowerTrip produced few false positives, which could lead to unnecessary downtime
in an industrial or clinical setting.
5.5.7

Classiﬁcation Accuracy

To systematically select the size of the window over which PowerTrip calculates
features, we tested six values ranging from 1 second to 60 seconds. Each window size
was tested once using the full dataset for each device. The window size presents a
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tradeoﬀ in terms of accuracy. Excessively narrow windows could fail to accurately
capture longer-running operations on devices like the compounder and excessively
wide windows could lower the eﬀective signal strength of short-lived operations, allowing malware to go undetected. For all three datasets, we found that 5-second
windows produced near-maximal accuracy for all three classiﬁers and that the accuracy tended to decrease slowly as the window size increased. Figure 5.7 summarizes
the results.
To determine how many training samples PowerTrip requires to reliably separate
normal from abnormal behavior, we randomly selected one third of all samples from
each dataset for testing and trained on 10–100% of the remaining samples in 10%
increments. Each training set size was tested once per device and the training sets
contained samples of both normal and abnormal operation. Figure 5.8 summarizes
the results, which show diminishing returns in accuracy for the compounder and
PLC datasets after approximately 500 samples and for the substation computer after
1000 samples. Assuming 5-second training samples, gathering a suﬃcient training set
would be a matter of only one or two hours assuming that the state space is explored
rapidly. In practice, a longer training deployment would probably be necessary to
capture all of the acceptable variation.

5.6

Related Work

Cárdenas et al. provide an overview of the challenges endemic to SCADA systems,
including the diﬃculty of modifying them once they are deployed, and propose an
approach to SCADA-device anomaly detection that uses knowledge of the system
being monitored to develop a template of normal behavior [11]. Unlike our work,
Cárdenas et al. evaluate their system in simulation and rely on directly observing the
physical devices attached to a control system as inputs and outputs.
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Similar to our approach, Cheung et al. advocate model-based malware-detection
techniques for Modbus TCP networks and develop an IDS based on this model [76].
Beside our emphasis on power traces instead of network traces, we do not make any
assumptions about the protocols in use in the SCADA systems that we seek to protect.
In the area of PLC malware, McLaughlin and McDaniel designed SABOT, a
system that generates PLC exploits by matching physical controllers to an adversaryprovided model of a control system [55]. Testing our detection techniques against their
exploits would be a good next step. They also introduce a method of PLC program
analysis that could enhance our techniques’ models of normal behavior.
LeMay and Gunter explore the problem of attestation for SCADA systems and
propose cumulative attestation kernels, essentially bootloaders for embedded systems
that provide cryptographic guarantees of software identity [51], akin to Trusted Platform Modules (TPMs) found on mainstream PC hardware. This technique could be
useful for assertions of software validity in embedded systems such as PLCs; however,
incorporating it in devices would require design changes that may be unpalatable
to manufacturers. However, we remain hopeful that an attestation-based approach
will enable manufacturers to streamline device upgrades for devices they do not want
users to modify.
Mohan et al. describe a system that ﬂags variations of execution time or activation frequency in PLCs and acts to preserve developer-supplied time invariants [59].
Our work uses comparatively complex machine-learning techniques that learn variations on correct behavior. Another key diﬀerence is that our mechanisms do not
intervene when they detect anomalous behavior; rather, they are meant to provide
useful information to administrators even when the systems are not modiﬁable.
Khan et al. use power tracing to diagnose problems with sensor nodes deployed
in the ﬁeld [40]. They train a Hidden Markov Model classiﬁer on time-domain power
traces to identify normal behavior and a variety of failure modes. Our work builds
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atop their techniques, but it focuses on a wider variety of devices and must consider
adversarial scenarios in which illegitimate patterns may hide in legitimate ones.
Cui et al. propose the use of software symbiotes, pieces of integrity-checking code
interwoven in embedded software, to detect and prevent malware infections of embedded devices (chieﬂy routers) [17]. They also propose networking their software into
a kind of distributed intrusion-detection grid [16]. These techniques may increase
software robustness when policy permits device modiﬁcation, but we were unable to
test their claims because they did not make the source code available.
5.6.1

AC power event recognition

Previous work measured on–oﬀ transitions at a large granularity from a household
vantage point. We borrow the goal of nonintrusive monitoring from Hart’s nonintrusive load monitoring (NILM), which maps changes in total household power consumption to appliance activations [31]. In the same vein, Gupta et al. propose ElectriSense,
a nonintrusive system that uses a single-point monitor to detect electromagnetic interference (EMI) generated by power supplies [29]. By analyzing frequency-domain
power signatures, ElectriSense detects simultaneous device activation, a limitation of
previous approaches. Both NILM and ElectriSense eﬀectively capture and identify
on and oﬀ events at the device level, but neither targets malware classiﬁcation.
5.6.2

Activity classiﬁcation from AC traces

Our work is conceptually related to previous work analyzing power traces from
embedded systems. In particular, Enev et al. reﬁned the ElectriSense concept by
studying the correlation of EMI with video signals being played on modern highdeﬁnition televisions, achieving over 96% classiﬁcation accuracy with six out of eight
HDTV models [19]. They classiﬁed signals (video segments) more than 15 minutes
long. In comparison, we focus on classifying signals containing shorter periods of
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activity. Our sensing apparatus is also simpler, relying on a single sense resistor and
no hardware ﬁltering.
5.6.3

DC power analysis

Our methods are not designed to ﬁnd key material, unlike past work studying
DC circuits that required pin-level access to components or detailed knowledge of
the circuits under test. Kocher et al. summarize much of the abundant research on
timing and power side channels [43, 44].
Kim et al. and Liu et al. propose and evaluate power analysis as a malware detection mechanism for mobile phones [53, 42]. Liu et al. present VirusMeter, which uses
explicit modeling of a small number of user actions to build a state machine and ﬂag
later anomalous power consumption using a variety of classiﬁers. Kim et al. apply a
similar approach that requires oﬄine physical measurements of the device under test
to create a suitable model for later use. Kim et al. build signatures for speciﬁc pieces
of malware and perform classiﬁcation using the χ2 distance metric. Like VirusMeter,
their system relies on power consumption information provided by the phone that
they seek to protect. Our techniques do not require software modiﬁcations to the
device under test and do not use potentially untrustworthy software APIs to obtain
power consumption information.
Finally, this work conceptually extends the recent explorations of AC power analysis by Clark et al. that classiﬁed power signatures of webpages with a frequencydomain classiﬁer and proposed applying power analysis to the problem of malware
detection [15, 14]. Their analysis focused on general-purpose commodity computing
devices and did not incorporate any modeling; we extend this technique to embedded
devices that exhibit smaller state spaces.
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5.7

Discussion and Extensions

While the power-analysis techniques in this chapter show some promise for revealing malicious activity on embedded or hard-to-change devices, they are not a
complete solution to the problem of malware on these devices. This section discusses
some of the issues still surrounding real-world deployment of PowerTrip and the generalizability of our technique.
5.7.1

Deployment Scenarios

Because our measurement mechanisms are low cost and nonintrusive, we envision
pairing embedded devices with measurement points. As mentioned in Section 5.5.2,
an AC measurement point could be a simple “wall wart” form-factor brick with one
or more pass-through outlets into which devices could be plugged, or even an in-wall
outlet box that looks exactly like a standard outlet plate. In a networked environment, measurement points would stream their readings to a centralized computer
for classiﬁcation and logging. To save traﬃc, each measurement point could use a
low-cost microcontroller to perform feature extraction, then send only sets of feature
vectors. Instrumenting only select devices, e.g., those that owners know run outdated
software or require network connections, is another possibility that would reduce the
management burden while providing increased visibility.
The best strategy for balancing the risks of false positives and false negatives in
a clinical or industrial setting is not yet clear. It is a waste of resources for device
maintainers to follow up on excessive false positives, but decreasing system sensitivity
too far runs the risk of ignoring valid alarms. By designing PowerTrip primarily as
an oﬄine reporting tool intended to gather evidence of suspicious activity, we hope to
minimize the risk of introducing complexity without providing valuable new evidence
of infections.
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5.7.2

NIDS

Networked intrusion detection systems (NIDS) are an important monitoring tool
for many sites. Unfortunately, most NIDS’ detection strategies depend on a certain
minimum level of visibility into the systems being monitored, such as access to log
entries or the ﬁlesystem. As described in the introduction, some vendors prohibit any
modiﬁcations at all to their systems—leaving NIDS unable to monitor their behavior.
We intend PowerTrip to be complementary with NIDS; in fact, it could feed its detection results into NIDS monitoring to provide visibility into systems that otherwise
would be unmonitored.
5.7.3

Generalizability

The substation and compounder systems we evaluated run “embedded” versions
of the Windows operating system. The key diﬀerence versus consumer-grade workstations is that the medical and SCADA systems are designed for speciﬁc applications
that constrain the computer’s state space—and consequently also constrain its power
consumption. In contrast, oﬀ-the-shelf PCs lack software or policy restrictions to prevent them from running many tasks simultaneously or executing new code. Without
a consistent base set of known-good behaviors on a PC, PowerTrip would likely raise
false alarms because of an inconsistent or inaccurate internal model. Furthermore,
devices without software restrictions can make use of traditional solutions such as
antivirus software.
Although it may not generalize to commodity PCs, our PLC results suggest that
PowerTrip would likely work well on other embedded devices that rely on ﬁrmwares
instead of true operating systems. With little or no concurrency, and with state spaces
that resemble ﬁnite state machines, many embedded devices are comparatively simple
to characterize.
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5.7.4

Opportunities for Static Analysis

For some single-purpose devices (i.e., those that run a single program rather than
a multitasking OS), the program structure may be simple enough to statically analyze
to build a model of expected power consumption. Such a model can then inform classiﬁcation of traces as normal or abnormal. McLaughlin and McDaniel take roughly
this approach to build models of PLC operation that help them infer operational maps
of SCADA networks [55]. Our techniques are intended to operate on power traces,
treating the systems under test as black boxes. With further insight into the ﬁrmware
state space, however, it would be possible to create a model of the state space or transitions without online training. Given a ground-truth model, PowerTrip could avoid
manual selection of parameters or non-deterministic training (as in Section 5.4.1).

5.8

Summary

Safety-critical embedded systems such as medical devices and process control systems need better protection against malware. Protecting these systems without modifying their strictly validated embedded software is a key challenge. This chapter
introduces PowerTrip, the ﬁrst malware-detection system for embedded devices that
monitors systemwide power consumption. Designed to detect aberrant behavior on
devices that exhibit constrained state spaces, PowerTrip uses machine learning to
model permissible behavior and detect deviations.
PowerTrip requires no hardware or software modiﬁcations to the devices it monitors. We tested PowerTrip on two types of industrial control (SCADA) systems
and a pharmaceutical compounder. For known malware, PowerTrip detects malware
with accuracy of 100%, 99.5%, and 94.6% on a programmable logic controller (PLC),
substation computer, and medical compounder respectively. The extremely high accuracy for the PLC is due to its use of simple state machines implemented directly
in ﬁrmware, which prove trivially classiﬁable. For unknown malware on AC-powered
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devices, PowerTrip’s accuracy degrades to 84.9% and 88.5% for the substation computer and compounder respectively. This performance is still competitive with the
state-of-the-art in behavior malware detection. The intuition behind the high accuracy and low false positive/negative rates is that safety-critical embedded systems
are designed to do one thing well and repeatedly—unlike general purpose computers. Malware causes subtle changes to power consumption that machine learning
techniques can then identify.

5.9

Malware Samples Used to Test PowerTrip
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Malware
almanahe
autorun
bamital
bredolab
delf
dorkbot

fakeav
kolab
mabezat
ramnit
sality
sillyfdc
virut
zbot
cryptic

Activity
Download and execute
ﬁles
Open port and IE instances
Disable system programs
Download other malware, crash system,
unhook API
Allow remote access
Download other malware, Initiate DOS attacks, Steal personal
info
Download other malware, Ransomware
Spam IRC channels
Infect host ﬁles
Run malicious routines
Infect and delete host
ﬁles
Disable services
Infect host ﬁles, create
backdoor
Steal personal info,
create bot
Download other malware

Devices
Compounder
Compounder
Substation
Compounder
Compounder
Compounder

Compounder
Both
Substation
Substation
Both
Both
Both
Both
Compounder

Table 5.4: Windows malware representing unusual device behavior.
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION

Motivated by the long-standing trend toward increasing energy eﬃciency, and thus
energy proportionality, we identify and evaluate security and privacy applications for
the system-level power side channel. We demonstrate that analysis at this granularity
allows detailed inferences about system behavior without software instrumentation
or hardware modiﬁcations. As energy proportionality continues to improve, this side
channel promises to provide richer, more detailed information in the future.
This thesis described an attack against user privacy that leverages standard machine learning techniques to identify which webpage a user is browsing from a trained
corpus with greater than 99% accuracy. The attack is eﬀective in the face of many
changes in measurement conditions, including the use of a VPN, caching, and changes
in the network location and interface. We also identiﬁed under what conditions the
attack is ineﬀective, including changing hardware and operating system or browser
conﬁgurations.
Exploring the possibility of new defensive techniques based on system-level power
analysis, we presented PowerTrip, a nonintrusive anomaly detection system for safetycritical embedded systems. After a training period, PowerTrip’s machine learning
classiﬁers can identify known malware or ﬁrmware reprogramming on the devices we
tested with at least 94% accuracy. PowerTripcan also identify unknown malware on
the Windows-based SCADA and medical devices we considered with at least 84%
accuracy.
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We also examined the underlying causes of diﬀerentiability in power traces. For
relatively simple embedded systems like programmable logic controllers, we found that
I/O transitions produce easily observed changes in power consumption amenable to
modeling. For commodity computers, we simultaneously measured the AC and DC
power channels to identify which power supply outputs most closely correspond to
the system-level power consumption and which components these outputs map to.
We found that the GPU and RAM are both poor sources of information, but the
CPU and motherboard components are more valuable sources.
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